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What Brady v. N.F.L. Teaches About the Devolution of Labor Law
Michael C. Duff ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
It is tempting to write exclusively in narrow technical terms about some of the very
interesting (to a lawyer or a law professor), but arcane, 1 labor law issues at play in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s 2011 decision in Brady v. National Football
League, 2 which prevented the players from obtaining labor injunctions against the league. 3
While this essay will, indeed, discuss my technical views on the labor law issues at play in
Brady—especially respecting the appropriate application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932
(“NLGA”) to pro football labor disputes—I do not want that discussion to obscure what I really
think about the case. In short, I think that sports labor cases—especially NFL cases—frequently
showcase the weakness of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) by perversely reducing it
to an offensive tool in service of employer interests. Such reduction is starkly at odds with the
intent of the original, worker-centered architects of the NLRA 4 and arguably even at odds with
later centrist (by today’s standards) NLRA reformers, who purported to move labor law to a
∗

Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law. B.A. 1991, West Chester University of Pennsylvania;
J.D. 1995, Harvard Law School. I offer my sincere thanks to Victoria Klein, Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Alex Long, and
Christopher David Ruiz Cameron for their helpful comments along the way. All errors are mine. Generous
financial support for this essay was provided by the University of Wyoming College of Law Summer Research
Funds.
1
It is tempting for me to engage in such technical exposition because the dissent in Brady v. NFL (Brady II), in an
earlier interlocutory phase of the proceedings, a decision on a motion for stay pending appeal, cited one of my
articles in support of its position on what turned out to be the key issue in the case, whether the Norris-LaGuardia
Act applied. 640 F.3d 785, 797 (8th Cir. 2011) (Bye, J., dissenting) (citing Michael C. Duff, Labor Injunctions in
Bankruptcy: The Norris-LaGuardia Firewall, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 669, 678 n.39 (2009)). The dissent did not
seem initially to realize that, in fact, my article in some ways better supported the majority’s ultimate decision, for
the article underscored the Congress of 1932’s intent that judges be kept out of labor disputes at all costs. Because
that was the practical outcome of Brady II, I might have concurred in the result had I been involved in judging it.
But I very strenuously disagree with how the majority arrived at its decision, and that is the main point of this essay.
In a later phase of the subject litigation, Brady III, my article not unexpectedly disappeared from the dissent’s
quiver. Brady v. NFL (Brady III), 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011).
2
644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011).
3
Id.
4
KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT, ET AL., LABOR LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORKPLACE 49–54 (2009).

1

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2254372

position of societal neutrality respecting labor disputes by amending the NLRA through
enactment of the Taft Hartley Act. 5 In fact, this is not as much an essay “about” Brady as it is an
extended discussion about many things that have gone wrong with labor law as exemplified by
cases like Brady.
Bigger than the question of whether antitrust law may properly be invoked in some phase
of a sports labor dispute is the question of why unionized football players wanted to invoke
antitrust law to further their aims instead of the benefits and clout imagined to be afforded by
labor law. 6 The twists and turns of Brady are strange enough for legal academics and specialists
to follow. But the arcane spectacle presented by Brady and cases like it is virtually impenetrable
to the general public if reports by sports broadcasters and the reactions of my students and
layperson acquaintances are any indication. For many people, labor disputes in professional
sports represent a major exposure—perhaps their only exposure—to labor law concepts. If those
observers equate labor law, and especially the NLRA, to the legal shenanigans that go on in
cases like Brady, I fail to see how they can come away with any positive regard for the statute
that Professor Ellen Dannin has called “the workers’ law.” 7 It is a very bad introduction to labor
law on a very big stage.
Consider the general oddness that in Brady the Eighth Circuit essentially refused to allow
unionized football players, members of the NFL Players’ Association (“the union”), to de-

5

There would have been no opportunity at that historical juncture to argue that labor law should openly serve
employer interests; neutrality was all that could be explicitly argued for. Id. at 67 (pointing out that the underlying
purpose of the Taft-Hartley Act was to “curb the growing economic and political power of organized labor”).
6
Here my focus departs from the perspective reflected in Professor LeRoy’s excellent recent article on the Brady
case. See generally Michael H. LeRoy, Federal Jurisdiction in Sports Labor Disputes, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 815
(2012) (focusing empirically on the frequency with which courts allow antitrust cases to proceed in the course of
labor disputes, finding that district courts are most likely to do so, and arguing that they should not). I am more
interested in the motivation behind the resort to antitrust law.
7
ELLEN DANNIN, TAKING BACK THE WORKERS’ LAW: HOW TO FIGHT THE ASSAULT ON LABOR RIGHTS (2006).
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unionize. 8 The players’ rationale for de-unionizing was grounded in tactical considerations—
frankly, in a sham. 9 By “refusing” to allow de-unionization, I do not mean that the court denied
the player-employees’ basic statutory right not to join a union. 10 Nor do I mean that the court
directly interfered with the sham, though I think it should have. I mean, in essence, that the court
applied the NLGA to the underlying “labor” dispute. 11 By applying the NLGA to the case, the
8

In this the court was supporting the NFL’s consistent position that labor law must be applied to these underlying
disputes. In a prior related dispute, the NFL purportedly required players to reunionize following tactical
deunionization as a condition of out of court settlement. See Brady v. NFL (Brady I), 779 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1002 (D.
Minn. 2011), vacated, 644 F.3d 661.
9
This is how the NFL characterized the disaffiliation, and I have no reason to disagree, though with not quite the
same level of moral opprobrium. The players had the legitimate objective of trying to improve their “terms and
conditions” of employment. The NFL filed a “bad faith bargaining” charge in connection with the sham, under
Section 8(b)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). As I will argue, the NFL may have been better
served by filing an election petition. The NFL’s invocation of the National Labor Relations Board’s (“NLRB”)
election process might have presented the District Court with a more difficult primary jurisdiction problem than the
one it encountered. It is generally true, as the District Court noted, that under primary jurisdiction doctrine a court
may decide, and not refer, an ancillary administrative law issue not requiring the involved agency’s expertise.
Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1006–07. But it is also true, as the court also noted, that Congress may specify that
certain adjudication is within the exclusive statutory jurisdiction of an agency. Id. at 1007 (citing RICHARD J.
PIERCE JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 14.2, at 1185 (5th ed. 2010)). Assuming, for the sake of argument
only, that a bad faith bargaining allegation does not lie within the exclusive competence of the NLRB, a “question
concerning representation” in an appropriate bargaining unit certainly does. Am. Fed’n of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S.
401, 409 (1940) (emphasizing that the legislative history of the NLRA makes clear that Congress did not intend for
representation proceedings to be subject to judicial review). Hence, the NFL might have filed a petition for election
in the bargaining unit—initiating a representation proceeding— on the theory that it had a good faith doubt of the
union’s continuing status as majority bargaining representative. See generally Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc.
v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998). The NLRB would then be under a different kind of pressure to resolve the issue
expeditiously, and the district court would not be required as a threshold matter either to ignore or to assess the bona
fides of the apparent sham. As I will argue, I think ignoring the sham is untenable in these kinds of cases.
10
Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
11
The Norris-LaGuardia Act prevents courts from issuing labor injunctions to suspend peaceful labor activity
occurring during labor disputes. There are two discrete NLGA issues under consideration in the football labor
dispute cases. The first issue is whether the NLGA is properly applied to prevent player-employees from obtaining
any kind of injunction, including an antitrust related injunction, against NFL employers in the course of a labor
dispute. The Brady majority said yes. I disagree, for reasons I will discuss more fully later in the essay. The second
NLGA issue is whether a “labor dispute” actually exists after players have disaffiliated from their union. There is
no question that the statutory definition of labor dispute is extremely expansive. First,
The term “labor dispute” includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment,
or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not
the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
29 U.S.C. § 113(c). Then, assuming that the facts of a controversy escaped the breadth of this provision, the Act
also applies when a case grows out of a labor dispute:
No court of the United States, as defined in this chapter, shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a

3

players’ disaffiliation from the union was thwarted, and they were in effect pulled back into the
labor law regime under protest. Thus, some of the difficult issues that I will discuss in this essay
were never reached in the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Brady, though they were reached in the
district court’s decision below. 12 The puzzling sequence of events hardly seems like it could be
related to coherent labor law. Perhaps specialists can work through such puzzles, but the “game”
makes no sense to anyone else.
It bears repeating that at the heart of the players’ strategy was a sham; they did not really
want to de-unionize. 13 Everyone knew that. 14 They wanted to apply economic pressure on the

labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with the provisions of this chapter; nor shall any such
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction be issued contrary to the public policy
declared in this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 101. A case is said to “grow out of” a labor dispute when it:
involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation; or have direct
or indirect interests therein; or who are employees of the same employer; or who are members of
the same or an affiliated organization of employers or employees; whether such dispute is
(1) between one or more employers or associations of employers and one or more employees or
associations of employees;
(2) between one or more employers or associations of employers and one or more employers or
associations of employers; or
(3) between one or more employees or associations of employees and one or more employees or
associations of employees; or when the case involves any conflicting or competing interests in a
“labor dispute” (as defined in this section) of “persons participating or interested” therein (as
defined in this section).
29 U.S.C. § 113(a).
12
See generally Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992.
13
In the 1993 settlement agreement between the parties, the NFL promised not to pursue the sham disaffiliation
allegation thereafter. I assume for purposes of this discussion that the promise would not affect the NLRB’s ability
to assess the bona fides of the disaffiliation. See generally Indep. Stave Co., 287 N.L.R.B. 740 (1987).
Furthermore, if a court concluded that the question of whether the players’ disaffiliation was a sham is “primarily
representational,” it is likely that the NLRB could retain jurisdiction of a “sham case,” even if the union first brought
a breach of contract action on the issue. DiPonio Construction Co. v. Int’l Union of Bricklayers & Allied
Craftworkers, Local 9, 687 F.3d 744, 748 (6th Cir. 2012).
14
Precisely the same tactic had been carried out in the litigation leading to the settlement agreement, pursuant to
which the NFL had in fact been operating since 1993 and leading up to the Brady events. Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d
at 1002 (citing White v. NFL, 822 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Minn. 1993)). The union purportedly disbanded after the
players disaffiliated. The newly disaffiliated players filed antitrust suits. Virtually the moment that the court in
White certified a class for damages and injunctive relief, the union and the NFL entered into the settlement
agreement. Id. Under the terms of the agreement, the NFL demanded that the players promptly re-certify the union.
Id. Can anyone doubt that the disaffiliation/re-affiliation machinations had more to do with avoidance of the
antitrust laws than with collective bargaining?

4

League for the purpose of achieving a desirable collective bargaining agreement. 15 I fully
understand that the motivation behind the sham had everything to do with the general inability of
workers to apply economic pressure in labor disputes because of the utter weakness of American
labor law. 16 I think the court probably understood this too, but I do not read in the opinion an
explicit acknowledgment of this subtext of futility. 17 Essential labor law weakness is what is
driving contemporary sports labor dispute cases.

This weakness now routinely forces

traditionally-unionized players in various sports to look for tactical legal solutions to bargaining
impasses that originate outside of the labor law regime, including solutions premised on a refined
kind of disaffiliation lie. 18 Thus, a labor law regime that has been ineffectual for “ordinary”
working people since at least the 1970s has now also become ineffectual for professional

15

The pressure first arises because in a given case, antitrust law subjects violators to treble damages, though how that
calculation would be made in the context of a group boycott violations is an extremely complex question. See
Patrick L. Anderson, Theodore R. Bolema, & Ilhan K. Geckil, Damages in Antitrust Cases, (Anderson Econ. Grp.,
LLC,
Working
Paper
No.
2007-2,
2007),
available
at
http://www.andersoneconomicgroup.com/Portals/0/upload/Doc2066.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2013) (explaining
difficulties and competing economic theories at play when calculating damages after antitrust violations have been
established). More importantly, a court decision that established that personnel practices violate antitrust law could
have far reaching consequences. Such a challenge represents a kind of “nuclear” option because it calls into
question the entire collective bargaining regime. Cf. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2216 (2010)
(holding that licensing activities for individual teams’ intellectual property, conducted through a corporation
separate from the teams and with its own management, constituted concerted action that was not categorically
beyond the coverage of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which made illegal a contract, combination, or conspiracy in
restraint of trade.). The upshot of American Needle, Inc. v. NFL is that the NFL’s licensing activities were thrown
open to court scrutiny.
16
It is also true of course that the career of a professional football player is on average so brief that protracted
collective bargaining is especially damaging to players’ prospects. A single lost year may have an incredibly
adverse impact on the career of a journeyman player. Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in
Professional Sports, 1989 DUKE L.J. 339, 403 (1989). In this context, bargaining for a new collective agreement
may assume enhanced levels of intensity and prompt resort to any and every tactic to get on to the field under
anything even approaching acceptable working conditions and compensation.
17
There is simply a general recitation of the fact of disaffiliation in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit’s opinion. Brady III, 644 F.3d 661, 667 (8th Cir. 2011). The District Court also seems to mention the event
offhandedly. Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1003.
18
Some commentators at times have stated that the players sought to formally decertify the union. See Allison
Stoddart, A Stronger Defensive Line: Extending NFL Owners' Antitrust Immunity Through the Norris-LaGuardia
Act in Brady v. NFL, 53 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT 123, 127 (2012). But as I will argue, “decertification,” an
NLRB process, differs from the type of deregulated “disaffiliation” that transpired in Brady and which looks
especially suspicious to an outside observer.

5

athletes. 19
I cannot agree, however, that the way out of the morass is unabashed engagement with
dissembling, 20 especially when such a misrepresentation is made for all to see on one of the most
visible of labor law stages. Never is there more interest in labor law among my students than
when a labor dispute is brewing in football.

The dissembling may provide an expedient

“solution” to a present controversy between the parties, but it looks dishonest, and it does
nothing to highlight actual issues in a way that is elucidating to the broader society or that assists
in developing labor policy. 21 I think resorting to such an ephemeral solution discredits the entire
labor relations regime. As I will flesh out in the next section, the district court in Brady should
have insisted that the question of whether players truly wanted to disaffiliate from the union be
sorted out administratively as a threshold matter by referring the case to the National Labor
Relations Board under a primary jurisdiction theory 22 to determine whether there was actually a

19

This is why I cannot agree with scholars who chide federal judges for not unflinchingly applying labor law in
antitrust/labor hybrid cases. See generally, e.g., LeRoy, supra note 6. In addition to various doctrinal difficulties
embedded in the interplay of the two regimes is the elephant-in-the-room reality that players will almost certainly
lose in the labor law paradigm. See Lock, supra note 16, at 355–59 (describing in compelling terms why the
players’ bargaining power is perennially weak and the owners’ strong).
20
Perhaps it was a “solemn public lie.” See Frederick Bernays Wiener, Another “Solemn Public Lie,” 27 U. RICH. L.
REV. 497, 497–98 (1993) (explaining Roger Williams’s use of the phrase and exploring such lies in entertaining
contexts).
21
This is often the case when public law controversies are treated as if they were private disputes. For a discussion
in the administrative law context, see William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and
the Public Interest–EPA’s Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55, 94 (1987).
22
For refined theoretical support, see Louis L. Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1050–52 (1964)
(arguing that primary jurisdiction is applicable to a greater degree in spheres where concurrent jurisdiction has not
been explicitly conferred to both the agency and the court and also noting, in particular, the NLRB’s exclusive role
in representation proceedings). More to the point, under the Eighth Circuit’s own precedent, there is a strong
presumption that representational matters having no clear connection with Section 301 breach of contract actions fall
under the NLRB’s primary jurisdiction. Local Union No. 204, I.B.E.W. v. Iowa Electric Light & Power Co., 668
F.2d. 413, 417–19 (8th Cir. 1982). The difficulty in Brady is that the employer filed an unfair labor practice charge
when it might have filed a representation petition on the theory that it had a good faith reasonable uncertainty as to
whether the union enjoyed majority support. In an unfair labor practice case (involving an alleged violation of law),
there was more latitude for the district court to take the position that abeyance under a primary jurisdiction theory
was unwarranted.

6

“question concerning representation.” 23 It is worth noting that when courts have previously
discussed the possibility of the nonstatutory labor exemption ceasing to apply upon player
“deunionization,” they did so in terms of decertification, not of some lesser, unregulated version
of disaffiliation. 24 If this is an unconscious imprecision, it is nevertheless a telling one. In the
end, of course, the disaffiliation tactic could not succeed unless significant numbers of players
felt strongly enough about whatever underlying dispute was at stake to walk away from their
sport to pursue antitrust litigation for the many years it would take to complete. 25 Much of what
is happening in these cases, therefore, is symbolic. The merits of the antitrust litigation are not at
issue. The question is how close the players can come procedurally to being able to argue the
merits of the antitrust case. The closer they can get to being able to argue the merits of such a
case, the better for them the ensuing collective bargaining agreement is likely to be. The larger
question I pose in this essay is how any of this can be good for labor law writ large or for the
ordinary workers typically covered by it.
Overall, it is a strange spectacle to see pro football owners howling for the application of
23

The NLRB has on one occasion taken the position in intra-agency administrative deliberations that no question
concerning representation arose in a connection with a “disaffiliation” during an NFL labor dispute. See
Memorandum from Gen. Counsel to Reg’l Dir., Region 6 (June 26, 1991) (regarding Pittsburgh Steelers, Inc., No. 6CA-23143), available at 1991 WL 144468. In coming to this conclusion, agency officials opined that “[i]n order for
a union's disclaimer in representing a particular unit to be valid, it must be unequivocal, made in good faith, and
unaccompanied by inconsistent conduct.” Id. at *2 n.8. The factual contexts of the cases the NLRB cited in support
of the proposition were wildly dissimilar from the posture of the NFL cases. In the typical cases raising the issue, a
union has clearly lost the support of employees and simply walks away or there is some inter-union intrigue in
which an incumbent union suspiciously disclaims interest just as an apparent rival union is filing a petition to
represent the incumbent’s employees. But even assuming for the sake of argument that the doctrine relied upon by
the Board officials in Pittsburgh Steelers were applicable, the conduct of the officials’ hasty analysis was
inadequate, for they decided in a conclusory fashion that “there has been no conduct by the NFLPA which is
inconsistent with its disclaimer.” Id. Thus, the officials continued, a question concerning representation was not
presented. Id. What, pray tell, happened to the good faith prong of the analysis? How long would it have taken, in
a reasonably vigorous examination of players under oath during an administrative proceeding, to ferret out that
players fully expected to continue being represented by the NFLPA when the labor dispute had concluded?
Furthermore, despite the union’s effort to demonstrate that it was really, really disclaiming representative status,
would not questions during a hearing explore the ease of the union in un-disclaiming?
24
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996) (citing with apparent approval, Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,
50 F.3d 1041, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1995)); Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293, 1306 (8th Cir. 1989) (Heaney, J., dissenting).
25
See Michael McCann, Legal Lessons from NBA/NFL Lockouts, http://www.sloansportsconference.com/?p=5244
(March 3, 2013).
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labor law to disputes with players. Once one understands the essential emptiness of labor law in
the absence of the ability of worker/players to engage in strikes combined with the
employer/owners’ nearly unlimited “right” to impose player lockouts, however, the picture
clarifies considerably. The owners rationally argue for application of a toothless law they need
not fear. There is nevertheless a special kind of oddness and repugnance to the court’s invoking
the NLGA to protect employer interests, and I turn now to explore that issue.
I will next discuss additional background helpful to understanding the Brady controversy.
Thereafter, I will discuss the historical background of the NLGA and show why the Eighth
Circuit’s reading of it was simply wrong. I will then move on to a discussion of why I view
Brady to be a provocative case that is both harmful to labor law and a textbook example of its
“devolution.” That discussion will be followed by reflection on other infamous examples of
courts not getting labor law “right”—of losing track of its “statutory music”—and of the role that
those examples have played in the general loss of labor law credibility. After reflecting upon
those examples, I will reconnect the discussion to the Brady case itself and conclude the essay
with a consideration of labor law’s future.
II. SOME BACKGROUND AND THE BRADY COURT’S TREATMENT OF THE
NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT
The Brady dispute was grounded in a disagreement between the NFL and its players over
distribution of new sources of revenue. 26 The nature or origin of the revenue is not especially
important to this discussion: it was “new” and there was a strong difference of opinion over how

26

NFL Locks Out Players, Who File Suit, ESPN.COM, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=6205936 (last
visited Apr. 14, 2013) (stating that “[u]nable to decide how to divvy up $9 billion a year, NFL owners and players
put the country's most popular sport in limbo by breaking off labor negotiations hours before the collective
bargaining agreement expired”).

8

it should be divided. 27 Upon reaching impasse over the division, the players claimed that they
wanted to abandon union representation, for “it would not be in their interest to remain
unionized, because the existence of the union would ‘allow the NFL to impose anticompetitive
restrictions with impunity[.]’ ” 28 The NFL then locked the players out. 29 The players probably
understood that the NFL could press its lockout to the point where the entire 2011–12 NFL
season might be cancelled. A sharp offensive battle over union disaffiliation might have seemed
preferable to a drawn-out lockout in which the union was exclusively on the defensive. In any
case, it became common knowledge that the purpose of the disaffiliation was to allow individual
players to sue the NFL as individual plaintiffs in antitrust actions. 30 The players could probably
not credibly threaten such actions if they remained unionized because the NFL was protected
from antitrust liability by the nonstatutory labor exemption. There was suggestion under the case

27

The story was perhaps a bit more complicated than was generally reported at the time. True, there was dispute
over the division of nine billion dollars of revenue. But there was also a more hard-nosed, labor-related dispute.
The NFL had previously agreed with the players that it would maximize television revenues, which would in turn
provide the players with a bigger piece of the pie, which they would receive after apportionment with the league.
When television interests became skittish about the possibility of a labor dispute in connection with the expiring
labor agreement, the NFL agreed to take less revenue from the networks if such a dispute were to materialize. The
players argued that this violated their “maximization agreement” with the NFL. See LeRoy, supra note 6, at 841.
28
Brady II, 640 F.3d 785, 788 (8th Cir. 2011). This was not a new argument. The players raised it successfully in
McNeil v. NFL, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1354 (1991). [We were unable to verify this source. The document in the
sourcebook does not match.] (I’ve confirmed the cite but added a pincite. Could you re-check? If we are still
miscommunicating maybe we could have a brief phone conversation or email communication) The district court in
McNeil allowed the case to proceed to trial on the underlying antitrust merits, agreeing that union disaffiliation
ended the NFL’s immunity to antitrust liability under labor law. A jury ultimately awarded the eight players who
were plaintiffs in the case a combined total of $543,000, though four of the players were awarded no damages.
McNeil v. NFL, 1992 WL 315292, at *1 (D. Minn. 1992). Obviously, the enormous implications of the principle
that might have been established by the award dwarfed the relatively low amount of damages in the single case. Not
surprisingly, the matter settled along with a second case, Jackson v. NFL, 802 F. Supp. 226 (D. Minn. 1992), that
was also then on the verge of going to trial. The ensuing “Stipulation and Settlement Agreement” in 1993
temporarily resolved several outstanding issues and effectively governed NFL labor relations right up to the onset of
the Brady controversy. Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1002 (D. Minn. 2011), vacated, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011).
29
“A lockout occurs when an employer lays off or ‘locks out’ its unionized employees during a labor dispute to bring
economic pressure in support of the employer's bargaining position.” Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1003.
30
This has become the new normal in sports labor disputes. The maneuver has also been employed or contemplated
in professional hockey and basketball. See George Richards, NHL Players’ Association Expected to Approve
HERALD,
(Dec.
21,
2012),
available
at
Decertification,
MIAMI
http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/12/21/3151305/nhl-players-association-expected.html; Howard Beck, N.B.A.
Season in Peril as Players Reject Offer and Disband Union, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2011, at A1.

9

law that if players disaffiliated, the exemption would cease to apply. 31 If the antitrust actions
survived summary judgment—which depended on the district court’s acceptance of the
disaffiliation argument—it was at least conceivable that injunctions could be obtained that would
effectively end the league’s lockout. 32 The clearest route to that outcome would be if the lockout
itself could be persuasively categorized as a commercial “group boycott,” potentially unlawful
under antitrust law. 33 The district court below accepted that the nonstatutory labor exemption
expired as a matter of law with the players’ disaffiliation and issued injunctions against the
employer to suspend the NFL’s lockout on an antitrust theory. 34 Thus, antitrust law was utilized
as a novel “weapon” to leverage the union’s position in labor negotiations. 35
When this mess reached the Eighth Circuit, the court preliminarily held that the players
could not obtain an injunction because a labor dispute—or a controversy arising from a labor
dispute—was underway. 36 The court found that the existence of the labor dispute triggered

31

The possibility of this maneuver was hinted at as early as 1989 in Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293, 1305 (8th Cir.
1989) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (stating that “[t]he practical effect of the majority's opinion, however, is . . . the labor
exemption will continue until the bargaining relationship is terminated either by a NLRB decertification proceeding
or by abandonment of bargaining rights by the union”).
32
Employer lockouts are lawful, within certain boundaries, under present labor law. To be lawful, the purpose of the
lockout must be to pressure the union into accepting an employer's bargaining position and not to destroy the union.
See discussion infra notes 33–35. However, the lockout was lawful only if it was ultimately determined that
antitrust law did not apply. If antitrust law did apply, the lockout might be characterized as an unlawful group
boycott under the Sherman Antitrust Act. Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 998.
33
See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 229–32 (1977) (explaining the concept of a group
boycott and observing that it is sometimes described as a “concerted refusal to deal”).
34
29 U.S.C. § 104 states that “[n]o court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any . . . temporary or
permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons
participating or interested in such dispute . . . from doing, whether singly or in concert,” any of several acts. Under
29 U.S.C. § 104(a), one of the acts is “refusing . . . to remain in any relation of employment.” The NFL’s argument
for applying the NLGA was that a lockout was a refusal “to remain in a relation of employment,” and that the court
accordingly was without jurisdiction to issue the “antitrust” injunctions. Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1022. The
district court concluded in essence that the antitrust case did not involve or grow out of a labor dispute. Brady I, 779
F. Supp. 2d at 1026-1032. [We need a citation in order to verify these statements.]
35
“Economic weapon” is a labor law term of art utilized routinely to describe a union or employer’s resort to a strike
or lockout, respectively, to leverage a bargaining position. Use of such weapons for such purposes is considered a
lawful, even normal, feature of American labor law. I am noting here what every reasonably sophisticated actor
knew—that the union was attempting to utilize antitrust law as an economic weapon.
36
Brady II, 640 F.3d 785, 791–92 (8th Cir. 2011) (determining that, given the timing of the surrounding facts, the
case arose from a labor dispute even assuming, for the sake of argument, the labor dispute had ceased to exist
because of the player’s union disaffiliation).
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application of the NLGA.

Ultimately, the court never reached the non-statutory labor

exemption, 37 which provides generally that conduct potentially attackable as anticompetitive
under antitrust law might nevertheless be shielded from antitrust liability through the preemptive
operation of labor law to protect “the collective bargaining process.” 38
Courts had previously struggled with the question of when the nonstatutory labor
exemption to the antitrust laws ended. The developing doctrine has held that the exemption
continues to apply even after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement, and,
apparently, for the duration a bargaining deadlock. 39 But the Eighth and D.C. Circuit Courts of
Appeal had suggested in opinions preceding Brady that the exemption might not apply in the
absence of a bargaining relationship. 40 The Brady court may have been poised to apply the
exemption despite the expiration of the governing collective bargaining agreement, even in the
context of the players’ disaffiliation. 41 In this posture, however, the court would have been hard
pressed to explain how the exemption could possibly be furthering “the collective bargaining
process.” The players had noisily rejected the collective bargaining process as the best vehicle
for achieving their aims. 42 One would have been left, therefore, with the continuing paradox of
labor law being rejected by employees, yet insisted upon by employers for the transparent
purpose of protecting their exemption from antitrust liability under circumstances seeming to
bear very little relationship to anything that could be recognized as the “collective bargaining

37

See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 235–36 (1996) (acknowledging and reaffirming the exemption in
the professional football context).
38
Technically, the theory is that federal labor policy “preempts” antitrust policy. Gary R. Roberts, Reconciling
Federal Labor and Antitrust Policy: The Special Case of Sports Leagues Labor Market Restraints, 75 GEO. L.J. 19,
58 (1986) (indicating that “[t]he nonstatutory exemption results from the preemption of antitrust policy by the 1935
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)”).
39
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
40
Id.; Powell v. NFL, 888 F.2d 559, 568 n.12 (8th Cir. 1989).
41
Thus overturning the opinion of the district court below to the contrary in Brady I.
42
Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1003 (D. Minn. 2011). [We could not find a relevant slip opinion, but we think we
found support in the case.]
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process.” 43 None of these conceptual rivulets seem remotely consistent with my understanding
of labor law or of its deep underlying purposes.
Despite this cacophony, I could have lived with Brady (and its ilk) as reaffirming an
expanding policy of protecting a “collective bargaining process” for transparently employerfriendly reasons in the narrow confines of sports labor relations.

But I cannot accept as

legitimate the circuit court’s ultimate ground of decision: that the NLGA may be invoked to
shield employers from employee injunctions during a labor dispute (if that is what this was).44
That holding is far from narrow. Furthermore, I cannot ignore certain other aspects of the case,
as did the district court below. The NFL and the players took positions premised on fictions: the
NFL taking shelter under a labor law that can no longer credibly pretend that employers—
especially those as powerful as the NFL—require protection from the ravages of “industrial
strife;” the players taking shelter in a dubious union disaffiliation. 45
I will next discuss why the court’s NLGA holding is plainly ahistorical. Then, I will
broaden the discussion to consider more generally courts’ troubling disregard for labor law
context in a variety of labor law cases decided in recent years. This kind of doctrinal analysis
has been undertaken previously, but I approach the discussion somewhat differently as a former
labor lawyer and union organizer who “felt” the vitiation of the law that questionable court
decisions represented and experienced their impact on “the street.” I will then explain why I
think Brady represents continued vitiation of the law and indeed crosses a kind of threshold into
the realm of the “devolution” of labor law.
43

Judy Batista, In Labor Clash, N.F.L.’s Union Calls Old Play, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2011, at A1 (stating that
“ ‘[w]hen management says you must have a union even if you don’t want one, that tells you the world has turned
upside down,’ said one veteran of sports labor negotiations who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he
was not authorized to speak publicly”).
44
The NLGA issue had not been reached squarely in the earlier sports labor controversies. Often, the underlying
cases settled before it could be addressed.
45
To be clear, the circuit court declined to reach the disaffiliation, resting its opinion on NLGA grounds. Brady III,
644 F.3d 661, 682 (8th Cir. 2011).
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III. THE NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Having sketched an introductory context for Brady, I now proceed to discuss the history
surrounding the enactment of the NLGA to set the stage for discussing broader points about
labor law. Congress passed the NLGA in 1932 with one overriding objective: to divest federal
courts of injunctive authority in peaceful labor disputes. Federal courts had been suppressing
peaceful labor activity by granting injunctions to employers. 46 Throughout the late 19th century,
and extending into the first two decades of the 20th century, employers had been using
(ironically enough) antitrust cases brought under the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 as vehicles
for obtaining de facto federal court jurisdiction over labor disputes. Once achieving any kind of
federal subject matter jurisdiction, these employers easily obtained injunctions that suppressed
peaceful labor activity, activity the common law had been routinely finding legitimate as a form
of worker self-defense by the early-20th century. 47 Indeed, the overwhelming sense of the 75th
Congress was that such injunctions were almost reflexively granted, and that the injunctions had
everything to do with the judiciary’s personal, class-based hostility toward labor unions. 48
Congress had first attempted to curtail these antitrust injunctive abuses through passage of the
Clayton Act in 1914. 49 But, when the Supreme Court interpreted the language of that Act in a
manner continuing to afford the judiciary a great deal of discretion in determining when labor
conduct was “legitimate,” Congress was provoked to further action by enacting the emphatic
46

FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 201 (1930).
The outline of the self-defense doctrine began to emerge as early as 1842. See generally Commonwealth v. Hunt,
45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842).
48
See Duff, supra note 1, at 677–81.
49
Section Six of the Clayton Act states:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the
antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or
horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock
or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from
lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members
thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under
the antitrust laws.
15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006).
47
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NLGA. 50
The panel majority in Brady asserted that the 75th Congress would have been “even
handed” (if the question had been put to it) and agreed that the NLGA should protect employers
from federal court injunctions during labor disputes, just as it always has been assumed to do for
unions and employees. 51 The proposition simply does not square with history.

The 75th

Congress could not have imagined a need to protect employers—in any respect, including
protection from labor injunctions during labor disputes—from the weak unions in existence in
1932. Unions did not yet enjoy sufficient density in the private sector to carry out work
stoppages of the scale justifying federal court intervention. 52 With the exception of railway
unions recognized under the Railway Labor Act of 1926, unions were without any of the
protections of positive federal labor law. 53 While minor judicial tinkering with the NLGA is not

50

Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 474 (1921) (holding secondary boycott not a legitimate object
of a labor organization, thereby removing such conduct from the protective anti-injunction sweep of the Clayton
Act).
51
Brady III, 644 F.3d 661, 677–78 (8th 2011).
The evenhanded introductory clause of § 4 still forbids a court to enjoin “any person or persons”
in a labor dispute from “refusing ... to remain in any relation of employment.” That the terms of
§ 4(a) afford employers less protection against injunctions than they afford employees (who were,
after all, the target of the controversial injunctions that prompted the NLGA) does not mean that
Congress gave employers no protection at all.
Id. Thus in 1937, the Court, close in time to the enactment of NLGA, was aware of the union-protective essence of
NLGA:
The evident purpose of [Section 9 of the NLGA], as its history and context show, was not to
preclude mandatory injunctions, but to forbid blanket injunctions against labor unions, which are
usually prohibitory in form, and to confine the injunction to the particular acts complained of and
found by the court.
Virginian Ry. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 563 (1937). By 2011, the Eighth Circuit had apparently lost the
core of this teaching.
52
Richard B. Freeman, Spurts in Union Growth: Defining Moments and Social Processes, in THE DEFINING
MOMENT: THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 265, (Michael D.
Bordo, et al., eds. 1998) available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6896. Union density was in significant decline
from 1921 to 1934, eroding from 17.4% in 1921 to 11.5% in 1934. Id. at 268, Table 8.1. While 11.5% exceeds
today’s private sector union density of under 7%, it must be borne in mind that overall density in 1932 did not
include public sector unionization, which in 2011 accounted for approximately 37% of that year’s overall U.S. union
density of 11.8%. See Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members Summary
(Jan.
27,
2012)
available
at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
(archived
pdf:
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_01272012.pdf)
53
The Railway Labor Act (“RLA”) granted unions in the railroad industry the right to exist. See 45 U.S.C. § 151
(2006). Most of the RLA architecture, however, concerned itself with mandated arbitration of contractual disputes
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now new, 54 I do not concede that the Congress of 1932 would have been supportive of even that
minor tinkering. 55 The 75th Congress did not as a body “like” judges and meant to keep them
out of labor disputes at all costs, which is why the judgment of the Brady court was at least
arguably in accord with the zeitgeist of 1932. 56 But it is wrong to claim that Congress would
therefore have intended for the NLGA to protect employers from employee or union labor
injunctions; that is, injunctions issued against employers involved in a labor dispute. From the
perspective of Congress, judges and employer interests were so closely allied that protection
could hardly have been thought necessary. 57 It is also worth noting that unions would have had
far less opportunity to invoke federal jurisdiction than was the case for employers. 58 Employers
had backed into the federal injunction business by bootstrapping injunctive proceedings on to
in which collective bargaining agreements were already in existence. See id. § 157. The RLA's limited jurisdiction
and strongly contractual character distinguishes it from later labor statutes of broad general applicability.
54
The exceptions to the anti-injunction rule that the law has recognized since 1932 were ostensibly created to
facilitate the collective bargaining process. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968) (holding that federal courts may compel by injunction parties’
continuing compliance with a collective bargaining agreement during a Section 301 breach of contract court action);
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 254–55 (1970) (holding that federal courts may
enjoin a strike when a collective bargaining agreement contains a no-strike provision coupled with the “strike
dispute’s” coverage by an arbitration provision).
55
I take the side of purposivists in seeking “to derive a constructive rather than subjective legislative purpose by
asking how a reasonable person familiar with the operative text, the background rules of interpretation, and the full
context of the legislation would have resolved the interpretive problem at hand.” John F. Manning, What Divides
Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. Rev. 70, 90–91 (2006).
56
At the end of the day the court refused to issue an injunction in a labor dispute, an outcome which I believe can be
argued to have some “cash value” — to borrow William James’s term, see GEORGE COTKIN, WILLIAM JAMES,
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHER 3 (University of Illinois Press 1994) — or to be a bottom line desideratum. The question,
however, is whether it is sensible to contend that the 75th Congress would have entertained such an argument in
1932. I think not.
57
75 CONG. REC. 4938 (daily ed. Feb. 29,1932) (statement of Mr. Norris). Mr. Norris stated,
We ought to hesitate before we take away from these suffering companies the blessed right to have
an injunction issued by a Federal judge, holding office for life, who, perhaps, forsooth, has
obtained his job upon the recommendation of the very men and the very corporations who are
asking the injunctions at his hands.
Id.
58
See, e.g., Tilbury v. Ore. Stevedoring Co., 8 F.2d 898 (D. Ore. 1925), aff'd, 7 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1925), summarized
in Edwin E. Witte, Labor’s Resort to Injunctions, 39 YALE L.J. 374 app. at 385 (1930)
In this case, an injunction and damages were sought by members of the longshoremen's unions of
Portland, Ore., to break up the “hiring hall” system of hiring longshoremen, which was claimed to
be a method of blacklisting union members. The injunction was denied on the ground that no
interference with foreign or interstate commerce was established and that therefore the federal
courts did not have jurisdiction
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antitrust cases. 59 Unions had no jurisdictional analogue. There were very few contemporary
reported cases of unions even seeking injunctions in the federal courts, let alone being granted
them. 60
IV. WHY BRADY IS “PROVOCATIVE”
Brady implicitly continues the notion that application of the nonstatutory labor exemption
is necessary to protect the “collective bargaining process.” 61 As Justice Breyer once put it, “the
implicit exemption recognizes that, to give effect to federal labor laws and policies and to allow
meaningful collective bargaining to take place, some restraints on competition imposed through
the bargaining process must be shielded from antitrust sanctions.” 62 One wonders whether a
weak union being consistently locked out by a strong, recalcitrant employer promptly upon
reaching bargaining impasse represents “meaningful collective bargaining.” It seems to me that
reflexive lockouts represent the death or “collapse” of collective bargaining. The problem
appears to be that, when there is a whole lot of anticompetitive activity afoot and precious little

59

I speak here of the “routine” injunction as ancillary to the Sherman Antitrust Act. It seems clear that the origin of
the federal labor injunction was as a device to quell the widespread insurrection of workers employed by railroads in
federal receivership during the disturbances of 1877. Walter Nelles, A Strike and its Legal Consequences–An
Examination of the Receivership Precedent for the Labor Injunction, 40 YALE L.J. 507, 533 (1931).
60
In 1930, Edwin Witte was able to identify only seventy-three injunctions that had been sought by unions in the
preceding quarter-century. Witte, supra note 58, at 380–387. Witte’s list shows only a single instance of a union’s
successfully obtaining an injunction in federal court, in Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks v. Texas &
N.O.R. Co., 24 F.2d 426 (S.D. Tex. 1928) aff’d sub nom Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks,
281 U.S. 548 (1930). But that case was an outright challenge by an employer-railroad to the newly enacted Railway
Labor Act. See generally id. It was not an example of federal court equitable involvement in an isolated labor
dispute but the courts’ vindication of the clearest legislative policy. Although Witte acknowledged the list’s
incompleteness, the general paucity of reported cases provides a clear impression that the Congress of 1932 would
not likely have had in mind the need to protect employers from courts.
61
Judge Bye, in dissent, pushed back against this potentially fantastic narrative by emphasizing prior Supreme Court
dictum that
“an agreement among employers could be sufficiently distant in time and in circumstances from
the collective-bargaining process that a rule permitting antitrust intervention would not
significantly interfere with that process. As one example of such a sufficiently distant event, the
Court cited a ‘collapse of the collective-bargaining relationship, as evidenced by decertification of
the union.’ ”
Brady II, 640 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Brown v. Pro Football 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996). The point is
not simply that decertification of the union represents such a collapse but that various other examples might exist.
62
Brown, 518 U.S. at 237.
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collective bargaining, an all-or-nothing approach to the exemption is misguided. 63
Also, Brady merely glosses the problem of the players’ union disaffiliation. I contend
that the bona fides of the disaffiliation must be probed somewhere for rule of law reasons. 64 I
think that Judge Heaney’s dissent in Powell v. National Football League appropriately took on
the question of the potential for addressing various labor-antitrust issues in the context of the
NLRB’s decertification procedures. 65 He concluded, however, that no one would file such a
petition. 66 The League would not do so, he contended, because of the potential for increased
antitrust scrutiny. 67 The union, he argued, would also not file such a petition because “the price
will be the loss of collective bargaining rights.” 68 But Judge Heaney’s discussion did not occur
in the context of a disaffiliation meant to end the nonstatutory labor exemption. I would argue
first that the League might have an incentive to file a representation petition because it would
thereby gain entrance into the debate about whether workers should disaffiliate. 69 Although it

63

Ethan Lock, Powell v. National Football League: The Eighth Circuit Sacks The National Football League Players
Association, 67 DENV. U. L. REV. 135, 153 (1990) (arguing that “[e]xpiration of the labor exemption does not mean
that management's restrictions on free agency necessarily have to violate federal antitrust law [because] [t]he
Sherman Act condemns only unreasonable restraints of trade.”). Subjecting practices, originally products of a
collective bargaining relationship, to increased scrutiny when bargaining breaks down would only invalidate
unreasonably anticompetitive practices.
64
See Charles Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive Judicial Politics?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 191, 236–37
(2011) (“If the legal establishment persists in its one-dimensional defense of an independent judiciary that proceeds
from a premise the public increasingly regards as counterfactual, it is only a matter of time before the public and its
elected representatives reassess the value of an independent judiciary.”). How can the general public continue to
tolerate the facially counterfactual threshold notion in these cases that the players wish to abandon the union without
some factual exploration?
65
Powell v. Nat’l Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1306 (8th Cir. 1989) (Heaney, J., dissenting).
66
Id. Technically, the League could not file a decertification petition; I assume the Judge meant that the League
could file an RM petition.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
An employer’s vehicle for initiating representation procedures culminating in an NLRB election is known as an
“RM” petition. Furthermore, the NLRB prefers that questions pertaining to whether employees continue to want to
be represented by an incumbent union be resolved in an NLRB supervised, secret ballot election. Levitz Furniture
Co. of the Pac., Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. 717, 727 (2001). In order to support the filing of such a petition an employer
need only establish that it has a “good-faith uncertainty” of employees’ continued support of an incumbent union.
Id. It seems impossible to argue that a purported disaffiliation of the union by employees would not create such an
uncertainty. Although the NLRB has on one occasion concluded that no question concerning representation exists
in the case of a player-disaffiliation, to come to such a conclusion without conducting a hearing is indefensible. See
supra note 23, at 4, and accompanying text. This argument, however, is vulnerable to the extent that antitrust
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would be a very odd kind of representation campaign to see the employer arguing for
unionization, 70 it is not impossible to imagine because the NFL has previously insisted on player
re-certification with the union as a condition precedent for settling prior antitrust litigation and
agreeing to a new collective bargaining agreement. 71 Moreover, the union and players might
(and should) opt to file a decertification petition so as to lift any cloud respecting the authenticity
of broad support for de-unionization.72 The NLRB should also favor a representation proceeding
to ensure employee free choice leading up to convoluted antitrust proceedings. It is hard for me
to accept that the interests of a superstar quarterback would necessarily be in alignment with that
of a third-year journeyman offensive lineman. Maybe they are, but as a former NLRB agent, I
would want to make sure of it. 73 I find it disquieting to see the overly broad application of the
nonstatutory labor exemption, and I desire to see all players canvassed officially by the NLRB
regarding their desire to leave their union, but these issues do not provoke me. Ultimately, I
consider Brady provocative because the case is symbolic of the federal judiciary’s broader
unmooring from labor law through its reading of the NLGA.
The NLGA is not just any statute. It represents the historical beginnings of a truly federal
labor law and policy. Its premise was simple: the legislative branch would no longer permit
federal judges to interfere with the peaceful labor activity of workers, whether or not those
typically upper-class judges happened to view the activity as legitimate. My blue collar roots
litigation takes too long to be pursued. If antitrust litigation could never succeed because players would not wait for
final judgments, the NFL may have an incentive not to expedite the proceedings. Perhaps this is why it has declined
to continue filing RM petitions. If that is the case then its subsequent complaints about sham disaffiliations are not
especially compelling in an equitable sense.
70
Under § 8(c) of the NLRA the NFL would have broad latitude to state its position on unionization during an
election campaign occasioned by the filing of a decertification or RM petition. It is hard to escape the conclusion
that it could offer virtually any opinion that did not contain a threat of force or reprisal or a promise of benefit.
71
Brady I, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 1002.
72
This is no doubt why the NBA players’ union’s first instinct in the 2011 labor dispute was to file a decertification
petition with the NLRB. See Howard Beck, N.B.A. Season in Peril as Players Reject Offer, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,
2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/15/sports/basketball/players-reject-nbas-offer-and-begin-to-disbandunion.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.
73
I served as an NLRB field attorney from 1997 to2006.
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simply bristle at the breach of the NLGA—a document I consider as foundational for the
American labor constitution establishing the legal legitimacy of the labor movement. Any
formal breach of the statute—as perhaps the greatest and most quintessential of the labor
statutes—is for me a harbinger of a serious global challenge to that constitution.74 I therefore
view superficial treatment of the statute as intensely provocative and pernicious. As I have
explained in the preceding section, the overwhelming evidence in the legislative record is that
Congress had absolutely no intention of protecting employers from labor injunctions. In a 1962
Railway Labor Act case, Baltimore & Ohio, the Seventh Circuit set out what I think to be the
only reasonable treatment of the question of whether the NLGA prohibits issuance of federal
injunctions against employers during labor disputes. 75 The court first noted that the Act’s
prefatory policy language strongly reflected that the NLGA was enacted exclusively with an
intention to protect the rights of workers. 76 The court went on to say,
While the Carriers earnestly argue that it is apparent from the legislative history
74

Even commentators disagreeing with the establishment of this “constitution” recognize the NLGA and the Wagner
Act as its “two main pillars.” See Charles W. Baird, American Union Law: Sources of Conflict, 11 JOURNAL OF
LABOR RESEARCH 269 (1990) (essentially arguing for the elimination of all New Deal labor law).
75
Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 310 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1962).
76
Id. at 517. The court set out the relevant text of the statute and emphasized portions of it the court deemed
significant:
“[T]he interpretation of this chapter and in determining the jurisdiction and authority of the courts
of the United States, as such jurisdiction and authority are defined and limited in this chapter, the
public policy of the United States is declared as follows:
“Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of governmental authority
for owners of property to organize in the corporate and other forms of ownership association, the
individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to
protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of
employment, wherefore, though he should be free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is
necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and
that he shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their
agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; therefore, the
following definitions of and limitations upon the jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the
United States are enacted.”
Id. (emphasis in original).
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and the terms of the Act that Congress sought to achieve the purposes of the Act
by limiting the participation of federal courts in labor disputes, regardless of
whether the conduct complained of was that of employers or employees, our
study of that history and the language of the Act above set forth convinces us that
the purpose of Congress in this respect was to protect only employees and unions.
We find nothing in the statement of policy to indicate any intention to deny
jurisdiction to issue injunctions against employers. Two isolated exceptions to
this overall purpose appear in the Act and serve to emphasize that they are
exceptional provisions. Thus in § 3(a) (b) (§ 103(a) and (b)), there are provisions
declaring unenforceable any agreement not to join, as well as any agreement to
withdraw from, a labor organization or an employer organization. In the other
instance, in § 4(b) (§ 104(b)), it is declared that no United States court should
have jurisdiction to issue an injunction against any person becoming a member of
a labor organization or an employer association.
The enactment of the Act was, of course, the responsibility of Congress, and not
that of this court. That Congress may have been intent upon shielding
organizations of employees from injunctions rather than employers was and is a
matter within its province. The same can be said of the exemption of labor
organizations from the sanctions of antitrust laws. Those are matters over which
the courts have no control, in the absence of a constitutional attack.
The language used clearly negatives any intention to recognize any general
reciprocity of rights of capital and labor. Essentially the Act is frankly a charter
of the rights of labor against capital. 77
I agree, and I think the matter is free from doubt. How, therefore, could the court
possibly read the statute in the manner it did? 78 My first, unfiltered attempt at answering that
question was emotional and concededly non-rational. When I was a young blue-collar worker
77

Id. at 517–518.
In reaching the decision, the Brady plurality cited two district court cases: one, Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 598
v. Morris, 511 F.Supp. 1298 (E.D. Wash.1981), was not appealed, and another, Clune v. Publishers Ass’n of
N.Y.C., 214 F.Supp. 520(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 314 F.2d 343(2d Cir. 1963) that was upheld by the Second Circuit
without analysis. Additionally, the Brady court cited an unreported per curium Seventh Circuit decision, which
held, without analysis, that the employer in that case was entitled to relief from an injunction issued in a labor
dispute. Chi. Midtown Milk Distribs., Inc. v. Dean Foods Co., 1970 WL 2761, slip op. at 1 (7th Cir. July 9, 1970).
In other words, the Eight Circuit could find no persuasive circuit court authority in support of its position that
NLGA anti-injunctive protections —on the books since 1932— applied to employers. On the other side of the
ledger were two circuit court opinions analyzing in detail the legislative history of the statute and concluding that the
history established that the “cease to remain in employment relation” language, upon which the NFL relied to
support its protection under the NLGA, pertained to the right of workers to quit and not be subject to federal
injunction to return to work. Local 2750, Lumber & Sawmill Workers Union v. Cole, 663 F.2d 983, 986 n.5 (9th
Cir. 1981) (quoting S.Rep. No. 63-698, at 51 (1914)); see also de Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores
Packinghouse, AFL-CIO, 425 F.2d 281, 291–92 (1st Cir. 1970). The court underplays these opinions, for they fairly
obviously stand for the proposition that § 4(a) of the NLGA does not apply to employers at all. Local 2750, 663
F.2d at 986; de Arroyo, 425 F.2d at 290–291.
78
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without an undergraduate degree and with only the scantest exposure to law, I attempted with
limited success to read labor-related judicial opinions.

Those opinions evoked emotional

responses in me. “My” side seemed always to lose. I found many such opinions unsupportable,
morally bankrupt, and intellectually dishonest. I could not yet articulate “legal” reasons for
finding them dishonest. But I instinctively blamed “the judges” for decisions I found discordant
with my class-based sense of what labor law ought to be. My unrefined line of thinking was
similar to (but decidedly less elegant than) that expressed in George Schatzki’s short, powerful
essay arguing that judges simply do not like labor unions. 79 I still agree with my understanding
of Schatzki’s view. Judges cannot respect the collective ethic that is at the heart of unions and of
unionism.

It is simply too foreign to their highly individualistic experiences and values.

Without sympathetic instincts, I had thought, judges will unavoidably and presumptively
misunderstand unions and reflexively misapply labor law. This was how I first “felt” about
Brady.
As my thinking has become more informed by knowledge of labor law and history, it has
developed in ways I did not exactly expect. The “fault” I had attributed almost exclusively to the
judiciary—my perception of its deliberate flouting of labor law, the first reaction that I had in
connection with Brady—I now see as the possibly inevitable by-product of dysfunctional
79

George Schatzki, It's Simple: Judges Don't Like Labor Unions, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1365, 1366 (1998). Professor
Schatzski stated:
Probably, no judge has integrated into his or her psychology a commitment to communitarianism,
although some may have adopted it as a theoretical construct. By their nature, judges, in general,
and Supreme Court Justices, in particular, are elitists, individualists, overachievers, meritocrats,
and fierce competitors; by their legal training and experience, judges have ingrained into them the
value of individual rights. It follows that the philosophy (if not always the practices) of the labor
movement is anathema to judges. The labor movement believes in primary concern for the group
(even at the expense of individuals), leveling, reward according either to one's existence or to one's
needs (and certainly not to one's merits), anti-elitism, less work and more play, and no competition
between employees. In certain ways, the labor movement celebrates the average, the typical, the
mediocre in and among us. It is no wonder that judges, of all people, are put off by the philosophy
of the labor movement.
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legislative ossification and, importantly, of labor union malaise. 80 The central legal justification
of labor law, after all, was instrumental: it was thought a necessary mechanism to maintain
“industrial peace.” 81 The statute itself recites that Congress was concerned with remedying
industrial strife. 82 There was reason to believe that industrial strife—especially as manifested by
strikes, lockouts, and the turbulent after effects of this conduct—would be a perennial feature of
the American economy. 83 I understand that other normative justifications were at play during
the period of the NLRA’s enactment. Some of these were ultimately nonstatutory, but implicit
from the contemporaneous deliberations, such as an encouragement of industrial democracy.84
Some made their way explicitly into the statutory formulation, like increasing the purchasing
power of otherwise individual, powerless workers. 85 But let us not delude ourselves. The
overriding normative justification ensuring the NLRA’s passage and the courts’ enforcement of
it was industrial peace. 86 Even when the NLRA was amended in 1947, the wave of strikes in
1946 had underscored the continued relevance of industrial peace policies in the United States,
and there was, accordingly, little serious thought that compulsory labor relations writ large might
somehow be jettisoned. 87
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See generally Cynthia Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUMB. L. REV. 1527 (2002).
Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 42
(1937).
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29 U.S.C. § 151.
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See e.g., Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 108–09 (1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that conflict
between employers and employees is “eternal”).
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See William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 61-63 (1999).
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inequality “tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of
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China)?, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 507, 517 (2011) (“But there is no denying that a central purpose of the
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MELVYN DUBOFSKY & FOSTER RHEA DULLES, LABOR IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 333–334 (7th ed. 2004)
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Today, work stoppages in the U.S. are rarely found. 88 Thus, why should judges take
labor law seriously, if the underlying rationale for it is industrial peace, especially in contexts in
which it is doctrinally unclear how, or whether, labor law applies? 89

One can imagine a

contemporary judge with the following thought: assuming labor law was first conceived as a
bulwark between aggressive labor and capital antagonists thought to be in perpetual conflict,
why is that body of law needed now, given the apparent evaporation (or extirpation) of the
conflict? 90 It was once feared that the fight between these allegedly intractable foes, whatever
the equities involved, would spill out into the streets and paralyze interstate commerce. That
seemed a problem worth addressing. 91 Now, we are beginning to openly confront questions that
may not have been explicitly considered in the 1930s.

For example, are there equities

concerning employee rights justifying a policy extending beyond industrial peace in the service
of interstate commerce? At this moment in history the justification that collective worker rights
are necessary to prevent widespread industrial strife simply rings hollow. 92
As unions have lost their willingness and ability to strike and much of their overall
vigor, 93 it has become much harder for judges to rationalize the broad intrusion of labor policy
88

In 2010, for example, there were 11 major strikes and lockouts involving 1,000 or more workers, the second
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supra note 86, at 517.
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See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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This I think is the thrust of the scholarship that has been exploring an alternative labor policy based on the 13th
Amendment. Professor James Pope has been especially prolific in this area. See, e.g., James Gray Pope, What’s
Different About the Thirteenth Amendment, and Why Does It Matter?, 71 MD. L. REV. 189 (2011); see also Maria L.
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GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 651 (2004).
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on “structural” grounds under various preemption, deference, and primary jurisdiction
doctrines 94 into facially unrelated policy areas. 95

To be sure, judges continue to follow

longstanding, and more or less uncontestable, labor law. 96

For instance, with only a few

problematic exceptions, 97 it is doctrinally as unlawful to fire a worker now for supporting or
trying to organize a union as it was in 1935; this is the most straightforward of the labor law
violations. 98 It is hard to argue that judges have not followed labor law in these kinds of cases,
assuming the NLRB can establish “substantial” evidence of an anti-union motive. 99 In “open
texture” or “structural” contexts, 100 however, unions and workers have been losing badly. 101

rights erosion is undeniable and I am therefore not trying to deny it. But I am not as much interested here in the
judicial incursions themselves as I am in the workers’ muted responses to the evisceration and the resulting impact
on the public perception of labor law. In most places, after all, labor movements have begun as outlaw
organizations. The very existence of something called “labor law” reflects societal accommodation, albeit in
grudging terms, of a force that demanded recognition. I am focusing on the seeming absence of continuing
demands.
94
Garmon and Machinists' preemption are good examples of these doctrines, and I will discuss Garmon later in this
essay. Those cases speak to jurisdictional allocations. In a world without much industrial strife it is a lot easier for
courts to tinker with the doctrines. Additionally, notions of court deference to administrative agency actions as
reflected most clearly in the 1984 Chevron case, were influenced doctrinally by early labor cases involving the
appropriate deference of courts to decisions of the NLRB. NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944) (“But
where the question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency
administering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing court's function is limited.”). In the absence of
industrial strife, courts simply do not experience the same kind of pressure to defer to the NLRB.
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See Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380, 383–84 (2008) (finding that the union violated the Drivers' Privacy Protection
Act of 1994 when it collected license plate numbers for the purpose of identifying bargaining unit members to
whom to direct its message); see also infra text accompanying note 170. Because unions have been almost
absolutely excluded from employers' property in recent years, it has been increasingly difficult for employees even
to hear unions’ messages. See generally Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992); see also infra note 118 and
accompanying text,
96
The authority of the NLRB to reinstate with backpay employees discharged for the purpose of discouraging union
membership has been settled since 1938. NLRB v. MacKay Radio, 304 U.S. 333, 348 (1938).
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See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151–52 (2002) (finding undocumented workers
ineligible for back pay because such awards would conflict with the IRCA).
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See James G. O'Hara & Daniel H. Pollitt, Section 8(a)(3) of the Labor Act: Problems and Legislative Proposals,
14 WAYNE L. REV. 1104, 1105–06 (1968) (describing unlawful discharges as the most essential labor law violation
because of its “malicious” character).
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Judicial disregard for labor law in open texture predominated in Brady to the point where courts
have now regressed to calling into question the NLGA, the foundation of American labor law.
This is incoherent devolution, not merely open-texture erosion; and the sports-labor context has
consistently exhibited a peculiar pattern of labor law incoherence and exerted devolutionary
pressures on labor policy. 102

Before discussing Brady further, I want to provide broader

examples of the judicial disregard of labor law outside of the sports context.

As I have

mentioned, these examples have been discussed at length in the scholarly literature. I seize upon
them now because of the impact I observed them having in “the real world.” They are related in
my mind to the Brady phenomenon because they were viewed by laypersons as unnaturally
technical and substantially incredible. I view the cases as part of a slippery slope of labor law
disregard culminating in the devolution that is Brady.
V. “KEYS” OF DISREGARD OF STATUTORY “MUSIC”
In 1947, Jerome Frank explored an interesting analogy between musical and statutory
interpretation. 103 There was always more going on in labor law than was immediately revealed
by the text of the statute—a kind of music or inner coherence. 104 As Professor Atleson has
shown, there were many instances during labor law’s evolution, from its inception really, in
which common law notions of property and management rights reemerged periodically to defeat
statutory rights; wherever possible judges read common law “management rights” into the

Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH. L. REV. 518 (2004); JAMES B.
ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW (University of Massachusetts Press 1983).
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http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol4/iss1/2 (explaining the “uniqueness” of applying labor law to the
professional sports and especially football).
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Jerome Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1259 (1947).
104
For those readers not drawn to the musical analogy I would point out that the inner essence of a statute has also
been thought of as its “spirit”: “It is a ‘familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not
within the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers.’ ” Nat’l Woodwork Mfrs.
Ass’n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 619 (1967) (citing Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)).
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NLRA. 105 Despite this dissipation, for a long period of time one could continue to hear the
statutory music within doubtful interpretations of the NLRA rendered by federal courts and often
by the NLRB itself. One could say with more or less a straight face during the “mature” period
of labor law that any tearing of the statutory fabric was leading to some greater statutory
purpose; the rending was on some level an unfolding of the inner statutory logic advancing to
meet novel contemporaneous challenges. 106

One could even argue that such doubtful

interpretation was necessary to advance the deep policy of the law.
The wise composer expects the performer to read his score “with an insight which
transcends” its “literal meaning.” He does not deplore the performer’s creative
activity, does not denounce it as “caprice” or “subjective tricks.” . . . Sometimes a
literal interpretation of a piece of legislation is indubitably correct. Often,
however, so to construe a statute will yield a grotesque caricature of the
legislature's purpose. 107
Looking at the situation in hindsight, one might now be justified in seeing such textual
departures as a conscious but non-malicious disregard of the statute—as a form of incremental
soft sabotage meant to diminish, but not to extinguish, the potential for real working class power
embedded within the statute. The soft sabotage might be analogized to a broader anti-democratic
spirit manifested by judges during the 20th century. As Jerome Frank explained, “When, not so
long ago, some judges were anti-democratic, they often obstructed the democratic will voiced by
the legislature. This they sometimes did by obstinately construing a statute narrowly, without
real regard to its intention.” 108 However, the incrementally congealed judicial departures from
the NLRA—the narrow constructions of the type Judge Frank was describing—eventually
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became widely understood if not accepted. 109 Whether the deviations were “minor key” frolics
or “major key” detours, one could still make out the musical theme in the whole while the
composer remained discernible.
For decades, interpretations of labor law resulted in a fine work of doctrinal local
coherence—a concert overture—if not always in a product reflecting correspondence of rules to
the reality of labor management relations and conflict. 110 One could read many cases over the
last half-century that did not seem quite right, but which connected to each other neatly. The
unifying themes of the cases created music of managed chaos, a chaos accepted because of the
presumed existence and permanence of labor–management conflict and the corresponding need
for negotiation writ large. Perpetual conflict suggested the need for at least some level of
cooperation. There was no question of anyone winning the struggle. 111 To allow the battle to be
fought without restraint was considered society’s loss, culminating in grievous injury to industry
and commerce. 112 Over time, the courts began to forget the sound and coherence of the music in
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minor and major ways, yielding to the reality that the deregulatory experience playing out was
not quite corresponding to the received tale. When the statute was disregarded, the promised
horribles failed to materialize. Unions were more or less quiet. Workers were more or less
quiet. 113 History seemed to move on without significant economic dislocation. 114
I now briefly discuss a few specific examples of creeping judicial incoherence and the
loss of the musical theme. Significantly, the reaction to the “creep” by unions and workers was
at best muted, a reality that judges who were already unconvinced by the statute’s industrial
strife policy have noticed, even if unconsciously. Minor ways of disregarding labor law statutory
music are heard most discordantly by everyday practitioners working in the field, but often not
by laypersons, or even by legally trained non-specialists. When courts interpret the NLRA in
silly, unnatural ways, they communicate to “repeat players” that the statute is not taken seriously.
Those repeat players are then quite likely to pass on the ethos to laypersons, even if they do not
mean to do so. I know I did as an NLRB agent. In these circumstances courts damage the
statutory regime slowly and incrementally rather than traumatically and immediately. After
recounting some of these minor instances of field incoherence, I will move on to a major one,
and then reconnect the discussion to Brady.

Experience has abundantly demonstrated that the recognition of the right of employees to selforganization and to have representatives of their own choosing for the purpose of collective
bargaining is often an essential condition of industrial peace. Refusal to confer and negotiate has
been one of the most prolific causes of strife. This is such an outstanding fact in the history of
labor disturbances that it is a proper subject of judicial notice and requires no citation of instances.
Id.
See Estlund, supra note 86, at 517–518.
114
Compare this state of affairs to the one leading up to enactment of the NLRA:
Recurrency of strikes affected our whole industrial economy. During the period from 1901 to
1905, approximately 14,000 strikes occurred, in a large proportion of which “the major issue was
the right to organize for collective bargaining or for union recognition, as it is technically known.”
Another wave of strikes occurred in the war and post-war period from 1916 through 1922, and
again in the period immediately preceding the passage of the Act from 1932 to 1935. These strikes
had an immediate and devastating impact on the nation's whole economy which affected entire
industries. Most of our states and, almost every type of industry was affected.
Earle K. Shawe, The Role of the Wagner Act in Preventing Industrial Strife, 32 VA. L. REV. 95, 98 (1945)
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A. Minor Key I: Inconsistent Deference to the NLRB
In theory, courts are required to defer to the NLRA’s permissible constructions of
ambiguous statutory provisions within the purview of the agency’s statutory mandate. 115 No one
would now argue that Chevron deference—named after the case that most famously announced
that courts should not second-guess agencies’ interpretations of vague statutes within the
agencies’ jurisdiction—is as simple as it once seemed. 116 In certain instances it is hard to argue
that the Supreme Court has even attempted to apply Chevron, or any other authentic deference
canon 117 to the decisions of the NLRB. This non-deference has been particularly noticeable to
labor relations specialists through the courts’ unpersuasive second guessing of the NLRB’s
attempts to unravel convoluted employee and supervisory definitions under the NLRA.
1. Who is an employee?
In Lechmere v. NLRB, 118 the Supreme Court held that “non-employee” union organizers
were barred from an employer’s property in nearly absolute terms. The general rule had been
laid down, but arguably qualified, in the 1950s-era Babcock and Wilcox case. 119 Following that
decision, the NLRB continued to administratively balance employer property rights with the
right of nonemployee union organizers to access employer property as reflected in cases like
Jean Country, 120 and eventually the Court took notice. For all practical purposes, it closed the
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door to union access of employer property entirely in Lechmere.
Lechmere had a profound impact on day-to-day union organizing. As a practical matter,
it had long been recognized that a union’s only real access to employees was face-to-face in the
workplace. 121 By cutting off such direct access, the Supreme Court in nearly absolute terms
denied unions the use of their primary organizational tactic: interacting with employees at
work. 122

The end of this kind of union-employee contact would severely circumscribe

organizing. Every practitioner of labor relations of every stripe knew it. 123 I spoke and dealt
with union organizers, for example, who were acutely aware not only of the decision but of its
symbolic power. What was more, the position of the NLRB—the agency with alleged labor
relations expertise—that such drastic banishment of union organizers would diminish employee
rights was rejected almost out of hand. Union organizers and labor attorneys confided in me
their surprise at the curt dismissiveness with which the Lechmere court assessed the NLRB’s
position in the case. There was obvious symbolic power in such a summary rebuff.
Chevron loomed large in the Lechmere opinion by virtue of the dismissive treatment
visited on the NLRB by the Court. 124 As the dissent argued, the question of access to employees
by “third party” unions under the NLRA is not addressed in the statute, and access issues
therefore necessarily present ambiguities. 125 The Babcock and Wilcox case had been decided

Accordingly, in all access cases our essential concern will be the degree of impairment of the
Section 7 right if access should be denied, as it balances against the degree of impairment of the
private property right if access should be granted. We view the consideration of the availability of
reasonably effective alternative means as especially significant in this balancing process.
Id.
See Alan L. Zmija, Union Organizing after Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB—A Time to Reexamine the Rule of Babcock
& Wilcox, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L. J. 65, 113–16 (1994).
122
See id.
123
See R. Wayne Estes & Adam M. Porter, Babcock/Lechmere Revisited: Derivative Nature of Union Organizers’
Right of Access to Employers’ Property Should Impact Judicial Evaluation of Alternatives, 48 SMU L. REV. 349,
371 (1995).
124
Chevron is cited almost in passing, curiously buried at the end of a string citation of cases. Lechmere v. NLRB,
502 U.S. 527, 536 (1992).
125
Id. at 545–46 (White, J., dissenting).
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prior to Chevron. The NLRB’s interpretation of the NLRA as permitting union access to
employees in non–working areas of an employer’s property accordingly seemed permissible
under deference principles, especially under the kind of cautious balancing scheme the agency
had been utilizing.

126

As a practical matter, the NLRB sometimes permitted organizational

activity in locations of a facility formally owned or leased by employers, but not part of working
areas, and otherwise frequented by the public without challenge or the need to obtain advance
permission. 127
The most jarring aspect of Lechmere for many labor relations specialists was the failure
of the Court to acknowledge that “non-employee” union organizers might arguably be
considered statutory employees presumptively afforded access to an employer’s facility to
engage in protected labor activity. 128 The NLRA does not limit employee status to employees of
any particular employer, and there is no legitimate conceptual reason why union agents
employed by the union would not fit into the statutory definition. 129 Non-exclusion of union
agents from the statutory definition of the NLRA makes sense. Under section 2(9) of the NLRA,
the term “labor dispute” is defined to include “any controversy concerning terms, tenure or
126
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as herein defined.
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conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of
employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employee.” 130 The definition mirrors statutory language in the NLGA and is transparently
directed at the tendency of the judiciary to see all labor activity undertaken by employees not
proximately employed by an employer as illegitimate. 131

Solidarity is trouble.

Through

application of “absolute” state property rights, the Court needlessly constitutionalized union
access.

Moreover, and more importantly for my present purposes, the Court sent an

unmistakable message to those involved in organized labor relations of its hostility and of its
intention to continue to interpret the NLRA in the narrowest possible fashion. Nonemployee
union organizers were necessarily “strangers” to the workplace, and employers need take no
notice of them unless employees managed to designate a union to represent them under the
difficult new regime. 132
More cramped interpretations resulting in statutory employee exclusions from the NLRA
exist; I will discuss one of them momentarily. In my labor law practice experience, however, the
professional union organizer exclusion was most notable. The determination had a palpable and
immediate impact on traditional union organizing. Still, I do not characterize court-authorized
banishment of nonemployee union organizers from employers’ property as more than minor
130
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disregard of the NLRA statutory music; the judgment was a plausible, if doubtful,
accommodation of federal-state “access” tensions that have existed for decades. 133 It is possible
to conceive of Lechmere as one end point of a continuum of constantly and necessarily shifting
conceptions of property. Ultimately, the decision may have as much to do with generally
cramped conceptions of property as with anti-union animus. 134 At bottom, the disingenuous
interpretation of the employee definition was not an open assault on the “core legitimacy” of
union organizing or collective bargaining but rather a narrowing of the field of conflict prompted
by judicial hostility. In the subsequent unorthodox salting campaigns, which developed in
reaction to Lechmere 135 and its rule of restricted access for unions, 136 the courts substantially
upheld the protected status of “salts.” This outcome seems unlikely if the intent of the courts at
the time had been to baldly prevent all union contact with employees, a development that would
have represented a “major key” departure from the statute.
2. Who is a Supervisor (and therefore not an Employee)? The Case of Nurses
The courts have continually second guessed and refused to defer to the NLRB on the
question of whether workers, especially nurses, are supervisors within the meaning of the NLRA.
The question is important because supervisors have almost no rights under the NLRA and can
play no part in encouraging unionization of health care facilities. Deference is admittedly an
imprecise enterprise, and courts may occasionally, or even more than occasionally, disturb
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Id. at 898–905 (describing the courts’ “decades long” struggle to accommodate state law property rights with
federal law labor organizing rights).
134
See generally Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90
NW. U. L. REV. 1283 (1996) (analyzing the common law right to exclude from private property in various non-labor
related business contexts and demonstrating a variety of puzzling inconsistencies).
135
Salts are professional union organizers who apply for and sometimes obtain—often surreptitiously—employment
with a non-union employer for, among other reasons, the purpose of persuading the employer’s employees to
unionize. See NLRB v. Town & Country Elecs., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 98 (1995) (holding that a worker may be a
company’s employee, within the meaning of the NLRA, even if, at the same time, a union pays that worker to help
the union organize the company).
136
Estlund, supra note 127, at 321 n.109.
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agency interpretive decisions. 137 However, the Supreme Court in two instances in a mere sevenyear period disturbed highly fact-sensitive NLRB decisions on supervisory status under the
NLRA. 138 This failure to defer to the NLRB is noteworthy given the infamously muddled
statutory definition of “supervisor.” 139 If ever a court were to defer to an agency, one would
think it would do so in connection with cases interpreting such a definition. 140 A nurse who is a
supervisor is not an employee within the meaning of the NLRA. 141 Each decision to classify a
nursing job as supervisory has the effect of deregulating the workplace with respect to nurses
falling within the classification. 142 While decisions overturning NLRB findings of supervisory
status have always seemed to represent a broader, calculated, deregulatory agenda, in no area has
this agenda been as strong as in the health care industry. 143

Frankly speaking, as an

administrative law professor, I think the Court’s decisions reviewing NLRB factual assessments
of the supervisory authority of nurses defy principles of “substantial evidence” 144 applicable
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See generally Eskridge & Baer, supra note 116.
NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 721 (2001) (overruling the NLRB’s interpretation of the
statutory term “independent judgment,” one of the factors in determining an employee’s supervisory status); NLRB
v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 584 (1994) (overturning the NLRB’s interpretation of
supervisory authority exercised “in interest of employer”).
139
Section 2(11) of the NLRA states:
The term “supervisor” means any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to
hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other
employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to
recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of
a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2006).
140
Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. at 579 (stating that “phrases [used by Congress] such as ‘independent
judgment’ and ‘responsibly to direct’ are ambiguous”).
141
Id. at 598 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that “[t]he Court's opinion has implications far beyond the nurses
involved in this case. If any person who may use independent judgment to assign tasks to others or direct their work
is a supervisor, then few professionals employed by organizations subject to the Act will receive its protections”).
142
Id.
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See Jennifer Myers, Are Nurses Supervisors: A Critical Look at the Circuit Split After NLRB v. Hilliard
Development Corporation, 3 U.PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 671 (2001) (discussing intensifying circuit court splits and
refusals to defer to the expertise of the NLRB on the question of nurse supervisory status).
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In Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), the Supreme Court explained that “substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 477 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
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generally to administrative adjudications. 145 The decisions taken together represent theoretical
embarrassment for administrative law and practical confusion for the NLRB and for the repeat
players appearing before the agency. I focus on the area of supervisory findings because it was
so striking to me in practice that individuals found to be supervisors were not “truly
supervisory,” and that everybody involved in day-to-day labor relations matters knew it . 146
Thus, I am not as interested in doctrinal parsing as I am in the pervasive sense among workers
and labor lawyers that the courts have completely lost the thread of workplace reality.
Charge nurses, for example, “are nurses who have some oversight responsibilities in
addition to performing patient care.” 147 The basic problem has been that such nurses historically
possessed the scantest “supervisory” duties, especially in nursing homes or in the case of
“Licensed Practical Nurses” (“LPN”). 148 I personally took affidavits from nurse-witnesses in
several health care supervisor issue cases and developed a clear impression of their perceptions
of the cases. In short, they told me that “charge” nurses were often “in charge” because no one
else wanted to be in charge, or because some nurses simply knew more about nursing than
others.

In many workplaces, charge-nurse duties were rotated, so that a relatively large

percentage of nurses in a facility had at one time or another been “in charge.” If a charge nurse

Accordingly, it “must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be
established . . . it must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict
when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury.”
Id. (quoting NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939)).
145
In the D.C. Circuit, for example, agency decisions premised on substantial evidence grounds are upheld on
average at a rate of about seventy-one percent. David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 178
(2010).
146
“The definition of ‘supervisor’ was intended to apply only to those employees with ‘genuine management
prerogatives’ so that those employees excluded from the Act’s coverage would be ‘truly supervisory.’ ” Ky. River,
532 U.S. at 727 n.8 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). I think that much of the Kentucky River
opinion is “a tour de force supported by little more than ipse dixit, [as] the Court conclude[d] that no deference
[was] due the Board's evaluation.” Id.
147
Amy Albro, “Rubbing Salt in the Wound”: As Nurses Battle with a Nationwide Staffing Shortage, an NLRB
Decision Threatens to Limit the Ability of Nurses to Unionize, 3 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 103, 115 (2008).
148
Jonathan Edward Motley, Grandmothers and Teamsters: How the NLRB’s New Approach to the Supervisory
Status of Charge Nurses Ignores the Reality of the Nursing Home, 73 IND. L.J. 711, 717 (1998).
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is a supervisor, a facility could end up with a large number of supervisors. 149
Findings of nurse supervisory status hamper union organizing efforts in at least two ways.
First, supervisors are by definition not “employees” under the NLRA, so a potential bargaining
unit is stripped of eligible members. Second, it is not permissible for supervisors to become
involved in organizing activity on behalf of unions. 150 If it is found that they have become
involved in such activity, any election in which a union has prevailed might be set aside and
rerun. 151 Because a union cannot know in advance if putative supervisors will ultimately be
found by the NLRB or the courts to be supervisors, it conducts at its peril an organizing
campaign in which there are disputed supervisory classifications. 152

The resulting chilling

impact on organizing activity is entirely foreseeable and tactically intended.
When courts refused to defer to the NLRB on nurse supervisory determinations,
practitioners understood immediately that mere assertions of supervisory status—that is,
employer assertions that apparent employees are supervisors—could paralyze NLRB
proceedings. I was at the NLRB when some of the supervisory cases were being decided and
witnessed some of the chaos first-hand. Pre-election hearings assessing the status of purported
supervisors were among the most tedious I had the occasion to preside over. It was widely
perceived, for example, that changed definitions and agency delay carried the potential for
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Memorandum from NLRB Gen. Counsel to Reg’l Dirs. (Oct. 31, 2003) (on file with author).
Evidence of supervisor-to-employee “ratios” is most useful if it goes beyond sheer numbers and
includes the workplace context. A seemingly disproportionate ratio may be reasonably explained
in a high-risk industry, where employers may conclude that closer supervision is necessary, but
considerably less plausible in cases in which the work is highly routine.
Id.
150
Harborside Healthcare, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 906, 909 (2004).
151
See id.
152
But see Veritas Health Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 671 F.3d 1267, 1273 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (upholding the NLRB’s
determination that an election was not voided because of pro-union conduct of putative charge nurse supervisors).
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reversing increased union density in the nursing profession, intensifying hearings on the issue.153
The impetus for the chaos was the courts’ de facto insistence on ignoring administrative law
deference canons. 154
Nevertheless, I regard all of this confusion as only minor key disregard of statutory music
because the statutory definition of “supervisor” was already explicitly muddled in a way that
invited judicial mischief. The courts’ narrowing impulses are in significant measure a function
of the statute itself. The development would probably not have been possible if there were a
clearer statutory definition of “employee,” despite the impression among many health care
workers that a health care employer could simply hand a nurse a clipboard one night a month and
convert him to a “supervisor,” when everyone knew he was not. From the perspective of nurses
sympathetic to unions, the game may feel rigged.

But the supervisory definition is the

responsibility of the divided Congresses of 1935 and 1947 and their failure to provide clarity.
The courts did not break the definition; it was already broken by the manifest legislative gridlock
of the era.
B. Minor Key II: Preemption and Implied Repeal
Also evincing judicial disregard for labor law “statutory music” has been, speaking
broadly, the tendency of courts to allow narrower policies embedded in sundry federal laws to
“trump” the much broader policies of federal labor law. The evil in the process is that in the eyes
of the broader society, NLRA policy is denigrated. The NLRA can be seen “competing” with
statutory regimes of much more recent vintage and of far more limited impact and “losing” in the
153

See Albro, supra note 147, at 112 (stating that “[o]ver the past decade, union participation has steadily hovered
just below twenty percent of the nursing population, but with the number of nurses in the workforce increasing
overall, the number of union represented nurses is also climbing”).
154
The ship seemed for a fleeting moment to have begun to right itself. Compare Frenchtown Acquisition Co. v.
NLRB, 683 F.3d 298, 316 (6th Cir. 2012) (upholding an NLRB determination that charge nurses were not
supervisors within the meaning of the NLRA), with Lakeland Health Care Assocs. v. NLRB, 696 F.3d 1332, 1349–
50 (11th Cir. 2012) (declining to uphold an NLRB determination on similar issues).
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competition.

The development has been effectuated in part through the thrusting aside of

Garmon preemption 155 principles in favor of what is a dramatic over-reading of “the independent
federal remedy” exception, as articulated in cases like the Supreme Court’s opinion in Connell
Construction. 156 “As a general rule,” the Garmon case establishes that “federal courts do not
have jurisdiction over activity which ‘is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [NLRA],’ and [in
such cases] they ‘must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations
Board.’ ” 157 The purpose of the rule is to discourage development of inconsistent labor policy
arising from a welter of tribunals. 158 Garmon itself did not concern a clash between federal
policies but involved a conflict between state and federal policies. But Garmon’s primary
jurisdiction language was sweeping and seems generally applicable to federal courts entertaining
suits in which there is conflict between federal statutory policies and the NLRA. As I will
discuss momentarily, this matter has not been resolved. Garmon broadly instructed that, where
conduct was arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA, the NLRB, and not the states,
should serve as the forum for disputes arising out of the conduct:
When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports
to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute
an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires
that state jurisdiction must yield. To leave the States free to regulate conduct so
plainly within the central aim of federal regulation involves too great a danger of
conflict between power asserted by Congress and requirements imposed by state
law. 159
This begs the question of when conduct is arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA. As to
that question, Garmon held that the determination was for the NLRB to make.
155

San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 626 (1975).
157
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 83 (1982) (quoting Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245).
158
Garner v. Teamsters Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953) (stating that “Congress evidently considered
that centralized administration of specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its
substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and
attitudes toward labor controversies”).
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359 U.S. at 244.
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At times it has not been clear whether the particular activity regulated by the
States was governed by § 7 or § 8 [of the NLRA] or was, perhaps, outside both
these sections. But courts are not primary tribunals to adjudicate such issues. It is
essential to the administration of the Act that these determinations be left in the
first instance to the National Labor Relations Board. What is outside the scope of
this Court’s authority cannot remain within a State’s power and state jurisdiction
too must yield to the exclusive primary competence of the Board. 160
Under cases following Connell Construction, however, a competing principle 161
applicable to conflicts between federal statutes has arisen that: “federal courts may decide labor
law questions that emerge as collateral issues in suits brought under independent federal
remedies.” 162 It is far from clear, however, when a labor law question is a “collateral issue” in a
suit brought under an “independent federal remedy.” More precisely, it is not clear what the
Connell court meant by the term “collateral” issue. Taken in its broadest sense, “collateral”
might mean simply an accompanying issue. That is, any time cases are brought under nonNLRA federal statutes possessing non-NLRA remedies, federal courts—rather than the NLRB—
may take or retain jurisdiction of the cases, presumably even if conduct implicating sections 7 or
8 of the NLRA predominates. If that is all collateral means, then the rule of Garmon will
necessarily be defeated. The only reason underlying conduct is ever arguably protected or
prohibited by sections 7 or 8 of the NLRA is that it emerges in the context of some other law that
might also apply.

The independent remedy rule seems to stand Garmon on its head by

establishing a per se rule working in the opposite direction: if other federal statutes arguably
apply to cases also involving labor issues, federal courts have virtually unfettered license to
assume or retain jurisdiction and decide those issues. The Garmon presumption, however, was
that courts would be far less likely to produce uniform labor policy than the NLRB.
I suppose that makes sense if one assumes, as many do, that the Garmon Court was only
160

Id. at 244–45.
Assuming one accepts that Garmon could in theory apply to a conflicts analysis as between two federal policies.
162
42 U.S. 616, 626 (1975).
161
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addressing conflicts between state and federal law. That is a difficult notion to accept because
the Court specifically referenced federal courts, and not just state courts, deferring to the
exclusive competence of the NLRB. 163 In Vaca v. Sipes, 164 for example, Justice White, while
acknowledging that Congress had carved out various exceptions to strict application of the
Garmon primary jurisdiction rule in both federal and state court contexts, presumed that the rule
applied to federal courts, that it continued to be vital, and that exceptions to the rule must take
into account “the effect upon the administration of national labor policies of concurrent judicial
and administrative remedies.” 165 Similarly, in Communication Workers of America v. Beck, 166
Justice Brennan cited Garmon reflexively in considering whether a claim that a union had
violated its federal common law “duty of fair representation” was required to be heard
preliminarily by the NLRB. He appeared to assume without analysis that the NLRB would have
exclusive jurisdiction of the claim in the absence of a qualifying independent federal remedy. 167
At a minimum, Garmon, Vaca, and Beck stand for the proposition that the Garmon rule is
presumptively applicable to federal courts. In deciding whether the Garmon presumption is
rebutted by the independent federal remedy rule, it appears that courts must consider labor policy
explicitly and balance it with facially conflicting federal statutes when deciding cases under
those statutes. Of course, courts would have had no reason to develop an independent federal
remedy exception in the first place if no good argument existed that Garmon did not apply to
federal courts and to conflicts between the NLRA and other federal statutes.
Assessing the independent federal remedy exception on its own terms produces instant
difficulty once the term “collateral” is subjected to adequate scrutiny. Black’s Law Dictionary,
163

Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245.
386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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Id. at 180.
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487 U.S. 735 (1988).
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for example, defines “collateral” as: “Supplementary; accompanying, but secondary and
subordinate to[; e.g.,]whether the accident victim was wearing a seat belt is a collateral issue.”168
If the independent federal remedy exception to Garmon was interpreted according to this
definition of “collateral,” courts would be limited to deciding labor issues that were “secondary”
or “subordinate” to a given case. The purpose of such a rule might be to prevent avoidance of
NLRB jurisdiction and forum shopping through artful pleading, a possibility hinted at by Justice
Brennan in Beck. 169 Presumably, courts would defer cases in which labor issues were not merely
secondary or subordinate to the case to the NLRB for resolution.
A superlative example of how failure to apply careful preemption analysis to cases
containing obvious labor issues can produce suspect results is the Third Circuit’s decision in
Pichler v. UNITE. 170 In Pichler, eight employees of Cintas Corporation, and five of their
relatives, alleged that the Union of Needletrades, Industrial & Textile Employees AFL–CIO
(“UNITE”) recorded license plate numbers from vehicles parked outside of Cintas’s Allentown,
Pennsylvania facility while engaging in a protected union organizing drive of Cintas employees
during the winters of 2003 and 2004. The plaintiffs alleged that the union used the license plate
numbers to retrieve the addresses of the vehicles’ owners from Pennsylvania motor vehicle
records and then contacted the owners at their homes to try to persuade them to join the union.
The plaintiffs alleged that the conduct violated the Drivers’ Protection Privacy Act (“DPPA”), a
statute meant to stem the increase in opponents of abortion rights using public driving license
databases to track down and harass abortion providers and patients.
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BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 257 (9th ed. 2009).
487 U.S. at 743 (observing that plaintiffs could not circumvent NLRB jurisdiction simply by casting an NLRB
statutory claim in terms of a different policy).
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542 F.3d 380 (3d Cir. 2008).
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License number collection has been thought of as garden-variety labor activity. 171 It
became more important after the U.S. Supreme Court barred nonemployee union organizers from
employers’ property in the Lechmere case. 172

License number collection was explicitly

mentioned by the Court in Lechmere as one of the methods the union in that case had utilized to
gain access to employees. The Court was satisfied that the union in Lechmere had reasonable
access to employees in part because of its ability to collect license plate information,
notwithstanding the barring of nonemployee union organizers.
The Pichler court not only failed to balance what appeared to be competing federal
policies, it explicitly refused to accord NLRA policy any weight at all. In this regard, the court
failed to devote any discussion to the NLRB’s historical treatment of the organizing conduct that
the court acknowledged was at issue. 173 If one did not know better, one might assume that no
“legitimate” countervailing labor law considerations existed. 174 The court never cited to Garmon
and never made reference to the independent federal remedy exception. 175

171

As the dissent

The collection of license plate information has been described by the NLRB as a “usual channel” by which union
organizers have attempted to communicate with employees. See Tech. Servs. Solutions, 324 N.L.R.B. 298, 303–04
(1997) (Chairman Gould, concurring) (including license number collection and distribution of handbills as accepted
organizing activities in the “typical work situation”); Falk Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. 716, 720 (1971) (criticizing a union
for not attempting to gather license plate information).
172
See supra text accompanying note 118.
173
Indeed, the court underscored the organizational nature of the conduct in dismissing the union’s argument that it
was engaged in the license plate and information activity in anticipation of litigation, an explicit exception to
application of the Driver’s Protection Privacy Act (“DPPA”).
174
As the dissenting judge in Pichler noted, the legislative history of the DPPA discloses that the motivation for the
enactment of the act centered on two infamous events:
A television actress in California who had an unlisted home number and address “was shot to
death by an obsessed fan who obtained her name and address through the DMV.” In Tempe,
Arizona, “a woman was murdered by a man who had obtained her home address from that State’s
DMV.” The Senate debate focused on the need to protect the privacy of persons from stalkers and
potential criminals. At that time, personal information was easily available from 34 states’ DMVs.
542 F.3d at 400 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
175
See generally Pichler, 542 F.3d 380 (failing to discuss Garmon). The district court below briefly discussed
Garmon in connection with the union’s preliminary motion to dismiss. 339 F. Supp. 2d. 665, 668–69 (E.D. Pa.
2004). The court curtly held that Garmon’s primary jurisdiction doctrine applied solely to conflicts between state
and federal jurisdiction. Id. at 669. As I have already argued, I think this is incorrect. See discussion supra notes
163–169 and accompanying text; see also Tamburello v. Comm-Tract Corp., 67 F.3d 973, 976 n.2 (stating that
“[a]lthough the Garmon doctrine, which is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution . . . ,
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observed:
[I]t is important to note that there is nothing illegal about efforts to organize a
union. It is one of the activities protected by our labor laws. There is no
indication that the need to obtain names and addresses of employees for the
purpose of unionization was ever brought to Congress’ attention when it drafted
the DPPA. 176
In light of the Pichler court’s failure to even consider balancing statutory policies, one is
driven to the realization that the court may have concluded, sub silentio, that the DPPA had
implicitly repealed sections of the NLRA affording protection to activities arguably protected or
prohibited by the DPPA. 177 To be sure, courts sometimes find under an implied repeal theory
that specific provisions of later statutes must prevail over general provisions of earlier statutes.
On the other hand, as the Third Circuit itself has recognized, courts should, in the absence of
clear congressional intent to the contrary, make every attempt to reconcile competing federal
statutory policies. 178 As the Supreme Court stated decades ago,
[t]he cardinal rule is that repeals by implication are not favored. Where there are
two acts upon the same subject, effect should be given to both if possible. There
are two well-settled categories of repeals by implication: (1) Where provisions in
the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict
constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one; and (2) if the later act covers the
whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will
operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act. But, in either case, the intention of
the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least as a
general thing, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a
substitute for, the first act and will continue to speak, so far as the two acts are the
same, from the time of the first enactment. 179
was originally concerned only with federal supremacy over conflicting state laws, it has been extended to cover the
relationship between the NLRA and other federal statutes”). Some courts have agreed with the district court’s
position, but that appears to be a minority approach. Teamsters Local 372 v. Detroit Newspapers, 956 F. Supp. 753,
759 n.2 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
176
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178
Remington Rand Corp. v. Gen. Servs. Admin., Office of Fed. Supply & Servs., 836 F.2d 825, 826 (3d Cir. 1988)
(citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1018 (1984)).
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Only the first category could apply under the Pichler facts. The Third Circuit might have
attempted to show that the NLRA and the DPPA were in irreconcilable conflict on the question
of driver license plate information collection.

It might also have attempted to show that

Congress had a clear and manifest intention to repeal the portion of the NLRA authorizing union
organizers to collect driver information. It did neither. It made no attempt to reconcile DPPA
and NLRA policies. Moreover, the court below admitted that it could discover no congressional
intent with respect to the interplay between the NLRA and the DPPA. 180 It merely argued that
because union organizational activity was not explicitly exempted from the general prohibition
on collecting driver information under the DPPA, the union activity was flatly prohibited, just
like any other activity not arguably protected by a federal statute. 181 The point of Garmon,
however, is effectively to provide the NLRB a role in developing federal labor policy precisely
because courts are often unwilling or unable to do so. Pichler demonstrates the wisdom of the
rule—without it NLRA reconciliation would probably never occur.
While I have been focusing on Pichler, a particular federal appellate court case, Professor
Cameron has made similar points quite effectively in the course of critiquing the Supreme
Court’s infamous opinion in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB. 182

According to

Professor Cameron,
[e]xcept for some narrow but significant changes made in 1984, Congress has
enacted no substantive reforms of federal labor policy since 1959. But the
Supreme Court has. Seizing on purported conflicts between the NLRA and other
federal legislation, the Court periodically has taken advantage of this repose to
“enact” its own substantive policy choices. In selected cases, the Court has set up
180

Pichler, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 669.
Pichler, 542 F.3d at 396.
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535 U.S. 137 (2002). The opinion held that an unauthorized worker discharged for anti-union reasons was not
entitled to backpay because such an award would be in conflict with immigration policy despite clear legislative
history that Congress in enacting the Immigration Reform and Control Act had no intention of disturbing NLRA
remedies.
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an apparent conflict between the NLRA and some other federal legislative
scheme, then resolved that conflict by effectively abrogating federal labor policy
in favor of federal “other” policy. Typically, the majority dresses its rationale in
the clothing of true congressional intent, and dismisses as the ravings of an
incompetent bureaucracy any views to the contrary expressed by the National
Labor Relations Board. 183
Professor Cameron points to Connell Construction as one example of this abrogation, 184
and, as should be clear at this juncture, I agree. Despite Pichler not relying on, or even citing,
Connell Construction, the spirit of Connell is manifest.

The independent federal remedy

exception to Garmon creates a slippery slope. Once it is vaguely permissible for labor cases to
escape the labor paradigm, anomalies like Pichler are sure to follow. 185
I raise the statutory conflict issue, and focus on Pichler in particular, because of the
impact such cases can have on the general public and in the world of practice. I cannot explain
Pichler in a doctrinally credible manner to supporters of the labor movement. How can a
drivers’ privacy statute, not aimed at labor organizing and of very recent vintage, be applied to
stifle the longstanding statutory right of employees to engage in accepted labor organizing
activities like collecting drivers’ license information? It was obvious that the purpose of the
activity was to contact employees to solicit them for union membership and support. I am also
unable to teach law students about cases like Pichler without transmitting to them the reality of a
legal hierarchy in which labor law is simply unimportant. I nevertheless conclude that these
developments, while important, are properly assigned to the minor disregard category. While
incrementally devolutionary, the erosion occasioned by assigning the NLRA a status of relative
unimportance in instances of statutory conflict does not rise to the level of major key like the
Brady case does.
183
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C. Significance of Minor Key Disregard
I chose the foregoing examples of minor key disregard of labor law because, although
they are not necessarily “inherently destructive” of the music of labor law, they operate day-today as pernicious depleting agents of labor rights and work over time as de facto deregulation.
They discredit and devalue labor law in the eyes of practitioners and the general public alike.
But their assault has been incremental. It is only over the long haul that they have contributed to
the hollowing out of labor law. I discuss minor key disregard to distinguish it from cases like
Brady, which arose in the context of major key disregard of statutory music: the labor lockout, or
more specifically the practically unfettered use of the lockout tactic, which has become a
standard operating procedure of employers as we proceed into the twenty-first century.
D. Major Key: Lockouts
Most of the major key departures from labor law have been so well canvassed that I do
not feel it would be useful to discuss them here. 186 But there is one major key departure that I
want to discuss, both because it is featured in Brady and in many other sports labor dispute cases,
and because it has exerted such a recent powerful impact on both the practice and the perception
of labor law. The increasing frequency of employer lockouts has become so noticeable to the
public that it was the subject of a recent article in the New York Times. 187 As Professor Chaison
noted in the article: “Lockouts were once so rare they were almost unheard of. Now, not only
are employers increasingly on the offensive and trying to call the shots in bargaining, but they’re
backing that up with action — in the form of lockouts.” 188 Steven Greenhouse, the article’s
author, contended,
[t]he number of strikes has declined to just one-sixth the annual level of two
186
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decades ago. That is largely because labor unions’ ranks have declined and
because many workers worry that if they strike they will lose pay and might also
lose their jobs to permanent replacement workers.
Lockouts, on the other hand, have grown to represent a record percentage of the
nation’s work stoppages, according to Bloomberg BNA, a Bloomberg subsidiary
that provides information to lawyers and labor relations experts. Last year, at
least 17 employers imposed lockouts, telling their workers not to show up until
they were willing to accept management’s contract offer. 189
Is the law of lockouts as presently understood consistent with the NLRA? To assess the
question a review of some basic labor law principles is in order.
It is generally lawful for employees, through their unions or otherwise, to strike. 190 It is
lawful for employers to permanently replace striking employees. 191 In discussing these strike
and replacement principles with law students and laypersons, I have found there is a basic
acceptance of the symmetry of the right to strike and the corresponding right of management to
replace strikers, though it has always been contestable that employers should be at liberty to
permanently replace striking workers. 192 The subject of the lockout is not as well understood
and, once understood, not as generally accepted on a conceptual level. In the early days of the
development of the law relating to lockouts, it was generally accepted that lawful lockouts must
be defensive: employers could defensively lock out employees if there was a risk that a union
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might strike when the employer was especially vulnerable. 193 While even this rule was never
free from theoretical challenge, it seemed defensible as part of the statutory symmetry of labor
law. 194 If workers could strike in a way that could seriously and possibly permanently harm an
employer’s business, employers could lock them out. 195 There was arguable symmetry provided
that all the employer was attempting to do was protect its business from the abnormally-injurious
fallout of a well-timed strike. Of course, it was also observed that employers already had a
counterbalance to the strike in the hiring of permanent replacements.
Then came the dawning of the legality of the “offensive” lockout. In American Ship
Building Co. v. NLRB, 196 the employer locked out its unionized employees before they had the
opportunity to strike during the cold winter months when the Great Lakes were unnavigable and
the company therefore experienced the height of its dry dock business. 197

Previously, the

employer had bargained with various unions who had strategically struck during the busy season,
and the employer was determined not to let it happen again. 198 The NLRB found a violation of
the NLRA. 199 It articulated its then-existing doctrine that lockouts were permissible only when a
strike was imminent and even then only in certain situations: “in order to protect the property of
customers, or to prevent waste or spoilage of perishable inventories, or where the public safety
and welfare are in danger.” 200 The Supreme Court squarely rejected the NLRB’s view that the
employer carried out the lockout merely “to resist the demands made of it in the negotiations and
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to secure modification of these demands.” 201 The Court famously found “nothing in the [NLRA]
which would imply that the right to strike ‘carries with it’ the right exclusively to determine the
timing and duration of all work stoppages.” 202 Thus, it has come to be understood that American
Shipbuilding “has obliterated, as a matter of law, the line previously drawn by the Board between
offensive and defensive lockouts.” 203
A couple of additional rules regarding lockouts are necessary to make some obvious
points about the perception of lockouts to all but the most esoteric of observers. First, lockouts
that are made purely in support of bargaining positions without even a hint of the business
exigency found in American Shipbuilding are perfectly lawful. 204 Second, bargaining lockouts—
that is, those that make no claim to being defensive—can be lawfully executed by an employer
even if the parties have not reached a bargaining impasse. 205 Finally, employers may lawfully
obtain the services of temporary replacements during a lockout, though they may not
permanently replace locked out workers. 206 However, the employer’s motive for locking out
workers may not lawfully be “anti-union.” That is, the employer may not take the action for an
anti-union motive or for the purpose of interfering with employee rights to be represented by a
union. 207
From the perspective of economically vulnerable workers, this set of rules is perilous.
All is well and good, of course, if a union and an employer agree to a collective bargaining
contract. But suppose they cannot agree and reach a bargaining impasse, a point at which goodfaith negotiations have exhausted the prospects of concluding an agreement. After bargaining to
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an impasse, an employer does not violate the Act by making unilateral changes that are
“reasonably comprehended” within its pre-impasse proposals. 208 In other words, the employer
may as a practical matter unilaterally implement the terms over which the parties have
deadlocked in bargaining. 209 Suppose the union does not like unilateral implementation. It may
lawfully call a strike of employees, and the employer may lawfully permanently replace the
striking employees. In theory, the employees can wait out the strike. In practice, they cannot. 210
Therefore, the union decides not to strike. The employer can nevertheless lock out employees in
the event that the union declines to accept its proposals, even if the parties have not reached an
impasse over the disputed issues. Is not the message to the union, “agree with us, and fast, or the
employees you represent will find themselves promptly out of work?” As the coup de grace, the
employer may “temporarily” replace striking workers during the lockout, though the temporary
nature of replacement is misleading as it is permissible for the duration of the lockout. 211
Many casual observers of sports labor disputes assume that work stoppages—for
example, the recently resolved 2012–2013 NHL labor dispute—are brought about by player
strikes. But as should now be clear, it is very dangerous for any union to engage in a strike. It is
true that replacing striking workers is more difficult when they perform jobs requiring more than
ordinary skill. Replacing a striking grocery clerk would normally be easier than replacing a
striking aircraft mechanic. This principle might cause one to assume that professional athletes
are not replaceable. But experience shows that this is not the case. In fact, the NFL won a
208
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resounding victory during the 1987 strike season as fans came out to watch—in this writer’s
opinion—simply awful football. 212 That loss for the players demonstrated what others in the
labor movement had long since learned: strikes only work when the labor movement is able to
persuade a much broader community of the inherent justice of its underlying cause. 213 This is
the essential theory of the union “corporate campaign.” To be blunt, it is simply difficult to gain
support from the general public for athletes widely perceived to be “already wealthy.” 214
Giving the employer the right to both replace and lock out workers creates a devastating
arsenal of weapons at the employer’s disposal; for if a union is too weak to strike, it is probably
also too weak to sustain a lockout. The interesting question is why it took employers so long to
uncover the inner logic of American Shipbuilding.

I am aware that many judges and

policymakers view this state of affairs as perfectly acceptable and even logical. I happen to
strongly disagree, but that is not really the question. Is it really possible to imagine that the
architects of the National Labor Relations Act had any such system in mind? The right to strike
means the right to strike. Expansion of the lockout obviously vitiates it. After all of the Sturm
und Drang associated with employee designation of a union, we have arrived at a moment of
realpolitik in which employees have rights until they disagree with their employers over terms
and conditions of employment, at which point they have nothing. I suppose that is one way to
achieve industrial peace, at least in the short term.
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VI. BACK TO BRADY
I return now to Brady, a case that seems the archetype of devolution. The NFL possessed
lockout power and exercised it. The players tactically resigned from the union in a manner that I
think strayed far from the original music of the NLRA, 215 but under this law one can wonder
what they were supposed to do. The district court played fast and loose with the players’ sham
disaffiliation and did not seriously consider the possibility of deferring to the NLRB’s primary
jurisdiction on the question. 216 The NLGA was torn to tatters. While purporting not to address
the question of when the nonstatutory labor exemption expires, 217 by applying the NLGA to the
players’ antitrust injunctions, the court strongly implied that it never will. If a labor dispute or its
logical outgrowth continues to exist within the meaning of the NLGA after union disaffiliation,
or, I imagine, after union decertification (the courts have not bothered to distinguish the
processes), when would there not be some outgrowth of a dispute that might be resolved through
the collective bargaining process? The expandable kernel of Brady, therefore, is that the players
are bound in perpetuity to a “collective bargaining process” that perhaps once was but is no
longer. It is a trap: “you can check out any time you want, but you can never leave.” 218 What
was once the workers’ law has been subverted to serve interests far removed from workers. The
outcome in Brady had nothing to do with a “collective bargaining process.” As Ethan Lock has
said so well,
[t]he purpose of the NLRA, however, will not be realized where the agreement
reached is based not on consent, but on a significant mismatch in relative
215
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bargaining positions. The requirement of good faith, arm’s-length negotiations
suggests that the union must be strong enough to extract some concessions from
management. At some point the parties’ relative bargaining positions are so
unequal that the agreement is not the product of arm’s-length negotiations. In
those cases such an agreement clearly fails to properly accommodate competing
antitrust and labor policies. 219
Unions cannot win under the present state of the law. If you cannot win with Tom Brady at the
helm, when can you win?
VII. THE FUTURE LIES AHEAD 220—FROM BRADY TO THE WILD BLUE YONDER
At present, Brady is the biggest case in which the court chose to simply ignore the history
of the NLGA. If the other major and minor instances of disregard of labor law that I have
discussed are devolutionary and represent “a sleep and a forgetting,” 221 Brady represents the
utterly forgotten fountainhead of labor law and announces that “devolving” has concluded and
“devolution” has arrived. When a student asks me what is “going on” in an NFL labor case like
Brady, I immediately provide the student with my office hours and an invitation to visit me later,
as it is unlikely that I will be able to communicate even the vague outline of the issues I have
discussed in this essay in a short, impromptu meeting. I submit that such operational complexity
is both unhealthy to society at large and dispiriting for the broader labor relations community.
But the complexity of the case is merely emblematic of deeper labor policy instability.
I was pleased to see that a former Chair of the NLRB, Peter C. Schaumber, would be
delivering the keynote address at the symposium of which this essay forms a part. It is always a
good opportunity for students, practitioners, and academics to gain the perspective of those who
have functioned in government positions relevant to a specific practice area. But when the
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former functionary proposes that the very governmental unit of which he had been a part be
eliminated, as Mr. Schaumber did, one realizes the exceptionally unstable nature of the times.
Mr. Schaumber’s proposal, as I remember hearing it at the symposium, was that the powers of
the NLRB should be transferred to the federal judiciary because the present incarnation of the
NLRB has been acting lawlessly by “unilaterally” altering interpretations of the NLRA without
adequate legal justification, especially in comparison with prior iterations of the NLRB.
It is very hard for me, as an administrative and labor law professor, to take such an
objection too seriously. As my students complain, the study of the labor law of the last fifty
years is in essence a study of the NLRB’s shifting positions on various classic issues and the
courts’ reactions to those shifts. 222 On the broader merits, however, Mr. Schaumber and I may
have some points of agreement. A deep irony is instantly presented, however, in any proposal
suggesting that labor law be turned over in total to the federal courts. Such a proposal ignores
the class dimensions of the origins of modern labor law. As I have indicated, labor law was
essentially born through a statute, the NLGA, which was profoundly hostile to the federal
judiciary. To return labor disputes to the same judiciary is completely inimical to twentieth
century ideas of labor relations.
In partial defense of Mr. Schaumber, however, I think that his proposal has the virtue of
trying to break what is an obvious impasse in federal labor relations law. I share his view that
the present state of affairs is unacceptable, but my reasons are vastly different from his.
Nevertheless, I am not hostile to rethinking the policy foundations of labor law with scholars and
commentators I suspect (or am certain) do not share my worldview, which is decidedly “proworker.” At the heart of the labor policy problem, as I have already contended, is the absence of
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the kind of industrial strife originally contemplated by the design of federal labor law. Reliance
on the “bargaining power” rationale of the NLRA, an explicit statutory policy justification of the
Act, 223 depends on acceptance of contested Keynesian economic principles. 224 Furthermore, the
bargaining power rationale is inextricably linked to industrial strife. The theory is that denial by
employers of employees’ right to organize and refusal by employers to accept collective
bargaining burdens commerce by, among other things, “causing diminution of employment and
wages in such volume as substantially to impair or disrupt the market for goods flowing from or
into the channels of commerce.” 225 Thus, the policy justification of conferring bargaining power
on employees is to prevent strikes and industrial unrest that may in turn decrease wages and
purchasing power, which ultimately may disrupt the market for goods in interstate commerce.
But, again, if there is no industrial unrest in the first place, the entire loop is called into question.
One answer to this problem is that the lull in industrial strife is only temporary. This
response is in accord with Holmes’s view that labor-management conflict is “eternal.” 226 The
possibility cannot be dismissed but implicitly assumes that “industrial peace” is both cyclical and
fundamentally economic.

However, there is good reason to believe that such peace is
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psychological and attitudinal. 227 In the meantime, we are faced with the kind of devolution that
cases like Brady reflect. Can we continue to sustain flagging confidence in the rule of law
indefinitely? 228 It seems unlikely. It simply will not do to merely await industrial strife, even if
we believe on some level that it must be coming.
As Professor Joseph Singer has argued, lawyers in recent years tended to eschew
normative arguments in favor of utilitarian, social welfare arguments that appear—at least on the
surface—more manageable because expressed in terms of quantifiable cost-benefit analyses. 229 I
think some of this dynamic was evident at the time of the enactment of the NLRA, but not
simply because the statute’s lawyer-drafters were uncomfortable with expressing labor rights in
moral terms. Ultimately, the NLRA had to be justifiable on constitutional grounds, and the
protection of interstate commerce—as well as the cost-benefit analysis implied in such
protection—suited that purpose. I accept that decision, as I must, though I can imagine purely
normative reasons for preventing the formation of what Jeff Faux presently terms “the Servant
Economy.” 230 Yet it seems incontestable to me that we are now in a different historical place.
The question is, what is labor law for now? I am persuaded by Professor Singer that lawyers and
law makers can and should play a larger role in posing and attempting to answer such
questions. 231
Professor Harry Arthurs has shown that there are various approaches offering answers to

227

Herbert R. Northrup & Harvey A. Young, The Causes of Industrial Peace Revisited, 22 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
31 (1968) (reviewing case studies of companies involved in peaceful labor relations with unions and finding that
positive outcomes were usually correlated with psychological and not economic factors).
228
At this very symposium, both former NLRB Chairman Schaumber and former NLRB member John Raudabaugh
contended that certain NLRB current practices failed to comport with the rule of law. I am not as interested in
whether the claim is true as I am in the phenomenological reality that significant sectors of the legal community and
the general public believe it to be true.
229
Joseph William Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 899, 927 (2009).
230
See generally JEFF FAUX, THE SERVANT ECONOMY: WHERE AMERICA’S ELITE IS SENDING THE MIDDLE CLASS
(2012).
231
Singer, supra note 229, at 928–29.

56

the question of the purpose of labor law. 232 Labor law might be embedded in a regime of
“fundamental and universal human rights”; 233 it might “empower workers by facilitating their
accumulation of human capital and the realization of their human capacities”; 234 it might “remain
unchanged: to enable workers to mobilize to seek justice in the workplace and the [labor]
market.” 235 In thinking about big changes to labor law, however, one immediately faces the
American reality of legislative gridlock that is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. The
challenge is how to reimagine labor law along lines that could conceivably be accepted by the
present intractable societal antagonists of “liberal” and “conservative.” Some “liberal” scholars
have essentially argued that the original labor law must be retaken, whether through legislative
changes or judicial reinterpretation. 236 But in the absence of an extreme shock to the established
political landscape, that is simply not going to happen. It is just as unlikely, however, that
“conservative” forces will be able muster enough strength to eliminate the weakened and
distorted labor law on the books. It seems to me there are two cooperative choices remaining.
One could soldier on with the status quo and witness the ongoing and potentially escalating
contortion of the law represented by cases like Brady. Or one could break the present impasse
by abandoning the federal project altogether, an option that might be agreeable to liberals and
conservatives alike. Even organized labor might sign on. Former AFL-CIO president Lane
Kirkland once famously said, in a late 1980s interview with the New York Times, “[a]s between
present law and no law, I’d prefer no law.” 237 I might add that at this point in history, as
between law that is a game—winnable only by elites, without policy foundation, and premised
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on obvious fictions—and no federal labor law at all, I would prefer no federal labor law at all.
One thing is clear, however. Labor law of whatever kind has never been a substitute for a
vibrant labor movement. Law follows the Zeitgeist of working people; it does not lead, though it
may make things easier by smoothing the way. One way or the other, through action or inaction,
workers will have significant input respecting their own fate. As we witness the devolution of
labor law that Brady so ably embodies, I am reminded of Professor Alan Hyde’s theory that,
“[l]abor law in contemporary advanced economies . . . is frequently, perhaps typically, a vehicle
for concessions to disruptive worker movements by threatened elites.” 238 A corollary of that
proposition is that where there is no disruption, there are no concessions. Brady takes us one
step further; where there are no concessions for a significantly long period of time, the law
forgets the music of the compromise and devolution is the result.
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